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Interpreting the Income Tax Act—
Part 2: Toward a Pragmatic Approach
David G. Duff*
PRÉCIS
Les quatre principales doctrines utilisées par les tribunaux canadiens
pour interpréter la Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu (l’interprétation stricte, la
méthode fondée sur l’objet visé, la règle d’interprétation littérale et
l’approche du libellé en contexte complet), de même que les principaux
arrêts dans lesquels ces doctrines ont été définies et appliquées, ont été
examinées dans la première partie de cet article en deux volets. Bien que
la Cour suprême du Canada ait formellement rejeté la règle traditionnelle
selon laquelle les lois fiscales devraient être interprétées de façon stricte,
elle n’a pas encore adopté une règle d’interprétation unique. Elle a plutôt
recours à la méthode fondée sur l’objet visé, à la règle d’interprétation
littérale et à l’approche du libellé en contexte complet, selon les cas. En
outre, des éléments de la règle de l’interprétation stricte persistent encore
dans la règle d’interprétation littérale et dans la présomption résiduelle à
l’effet que l’interprétation doit être en faveur du contribuable. Malgré ces
faits nouveaux au plan doctrinal, la pratique actuelle d’interprétation de la
loi de la cour est implicitement pragmatique, en ce sens qu’elle tient
compte de plusieurs facteurs pertinents : le libellé des dispositions en
cause, leur objet dans le cadre réglementaire, les intentions du législateur
et les effets pratiques des différentes interprétations.
Chacune des doctrines d’interprétation examinées dans la première
partie de cet article est évaluée dans la deuxième partie. Une approche
explicitement « pragmatique » y est élaborée à titre de solution de
rechange. Cette autre approche prend appui sur l’approche du libellé en
contexte complet au moyen de l’interprétation du libellé de la Loi « dans
son contexte global » eu égard à l’économie générale de la Loi, à l’objet
de la Loi, à l’intention du Parlement, ainsi qu’aux effets pratiques des
différentes règles d’interprétation.
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preparation of this article, I am indebted to research assistants Ben Barnes, Glen
Loutzenhiser, and Aaron Palmer, and financial support from the Heward Stikeman Fiscal
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La première des quatre doctrines examinées est celle de l’interprétation
stricte. Sa justification origine d’une conception en grande partie despotique
de l’État et de l’imposition qui prévalait au XIXe siècle. Récemment,
l’interprétation stricte est devenue moins privilégiée et elle a été
remplacée par d’autres doctrines d’interprétation, plus axées sur l’objet et
sur le contexte. Dans la mesure où ces autres doctrines traduisent les
objectifs de l’imposition contemporaine et le caractère démocratique de
l’État moderne, le rejet de l’interprétation stricte par la Cour suprême du
Canada dans l’affaire Stubart Investments Limited c. Sa Majesté la Reine
et dans les causes subséquentes ne devrait pas être regretté.
La deuxième doctrine examinée est celle de l’interprétation axée sur
l’objet visé. Une distinction est apportée entre l’intention précise du
législateur et les objectifs réglementaires plus généraux. Diverses critiques
à l’égard de cette méthode d’interprétation sont analysées dans cette
partie, notamment que l’existence d’une intention du législateur et
d’objectifs réglementaires est présumée, alors qu’il n’y en a peut-être
aucun, qu’elle confère une latitude excessive à des juges non élus, qu’elle
entraîne des décisions douteuses et la confusion doctrinale et qu’elle
contrevient à la primauté du droit en rendant les dispositions législatives
dépendantes de l’intention du législateur ou des objectifs réglementaires
non exprimés sous la forme qui fait autorité de dispositions réglementaires.
Bien que l’intention du législateur et les objectifs réglementaires soient
habituellement déterminables et pertinents à l’interprétation de la loi,
toutes les autres critiques constituent des objections valables à
l’interprétation fondée sur l’objet visé telle qu’elle a été définie et
appliquée dans le cadre de jugements récents en matière de fiscalité
rendus par la Cour suprême du Canada. Dans la mesure où l’interprétation
axée sur l’objet visé minimise le libellé de la Loi, il semble, compte tenu
des décisions rendues dans les affaires Sa Majesté la Reine c. Bronfman
Trust, Sa Majesté la Reine c. McClurg et Neuman c. Sa Majesté la Reine,
que cette méthode augmente le pouvoir discrétionnaire, favorise la
confusion doctrinale et sape la primauté du droit.
La troisième doctrine est la règle de l’interprétation littérale. Cet article
remet en question le processus d’interprétation qui est utilisé dans le
cadre de cette méthode, l’accent artificiel qu’elle place sur l’ambiguïté et
les présomptions qui y sont posées relativement à la compétence
institutionnelle des tribunaux et des législateurs. Bien que l’accent mis
sur le libellé des textes réglementaires par cette méthode d’interprétation
constitue une solution avantageuse par rapport aux lacunes de
l’interprétation fondée sur l’objet visé, la règle de l’interprétation littérale
va trop loin en ce sens qu’elle ne tient pas compte du rôle que les
questions d’ordre téléologique et contextuelle devraient jouer et jouent
dans l’interprétation du libellé des lois.
La quatrième doctrine dont il est question est l’approche du libellé en
contexte complet, qui est caractérisée par une synthèse positive de la
règle de l’interprétation littérale et de l’interprétation fondée sur l’objet
visé. À partir de la description de cette méthode par le juge MacGuigan
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dans l’affaire British Columbia Telephone Company v. The Queen, l’examen
porte sur l’étendue appropriée de l’analyse contextuelle. Il y est tenu
compte du « contexte interne » du libellé de la loi (le libellé de la disposition
en cause, ainsi que les autres dispositions réglementaires et les
caractéristiques structurelles, comme les en-têtes et les sous-sections, qui
sont pertinentes à l’interprétation du libellé) et du « contexte externe »
selon lequel le texte de la loi est compris (la compréhension générale du
langage dans lequel la loi est rédigée, les hypothèses pertinentes quant à
l’objet du texte et les critères juridiques et culturels de la société dans
laquelle la loi est promulguée et interprétée). Les défis que représente
l’interprétation de la loi selon les différents contextes juridiques et
sociaux y sont aussi examinés. Bien que les divers contextes pertinents à
l’interprétation d’une disposition donnée dépendent nécessairement des
faits de la cause, il est soutenu dans cet article qu’il est inapproprié
d’exclure toute question pertinente de la portée de l’analyse contextuelle.
Après l’analyse des quatre doctrines, les caractéristiques essentielles
d’une approche d’interprétation de la loi expressément pragmatique sont
énoncées dans l’article, la pertinence des effets pratiques des décisions
judiciaires y est expliquée et la manière dont les questions d’ordre corrélatif
et d’autres facteurs pertinents sont réunis dans le contexte d’un point
précis d’interprétation y est examinée. Tout en mettant l’accent sur
l’importance des questions d’ordre textuel, téléologique et corrélatif dans
l’interprétation de la loi, cette méthode d’interprétation favorise une
méthode ouverte et investigatrice de raisonnement judiciaire d’après
laquelle les tribunaux devraient, dans la mesure du possible, tenter d’assurer
l’harmonie entre ces divers éléments d’interprétation. Toutefois, lorsqu’il
est impossible d’atteindre cette harmonie, l’approche pragmatique
préconisée dans cet article est conforme à la pratique traditionnelle des
tribunaux britanniques, américains et canadiens puisqu’elle tient davantage
compte des questions d’ordre textuel que des questions téléologiques, et
davantage de ces dernières que des questions corrélatives.
Dans la mesure où, dans le cadre de ses décisions comportant une
interprétation de la Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu, la Cour suprême du
Canada examine déjà les questions d’ordre textuel, téléologique et
corrélatif, l’approche pragmatique préconisée dans cet article ne constitue
pas tant une dérogation de la pratique d’interprétation de la loi actuelle
de la Cour qu’une description plus satisfaisante de cette pratique que
celle contenue dans diverses doctrines auxquelles la Cour se reporte
présentement. Toutefois, dans la mesure où ces doctrines façonnent tant
le processus d’interprétation de la loi que le contenu des décisions,
l’approche pragmatique proposée permet une méthode d’interprétation
de la loi plus ouverte, plus raisonnée et mieux équilibrée d’interprétation de
la loi que chacune des autres méthodes possibles.
ABSTRACT
Part 1 of this two-part article reviewed the four main doctrines to which
Canadian courts have referred in interpreting the Income Tax Act (strict
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construction, purposive interpretation, the plain meaning rule, and the
words-in-total-context approach) and examined leading cases in which
these doctrines have been defined and applied. Although the Supreme
Court of Canada has formally rejected the traditional rule according to
which tax statutes should be strictly construed, it has yet to adopt a single
interpretive doctrine; instead, it variously employs purposive interpretation,
the plain meaning rule, and the words-in-total-context approach. As well,
aspects of strict construction arguably remain in the literalism of the plain
meaning rule and the residual presumption in favour of the taxpayer.
Notwithstanding these doctrinal developments, the court’s actual practice
of statutory interpretation is implicitly pragmatic in that it takes into
account a variety of relevant factors: the text of the provisions at issue,
their purpose within the statutory scheme, the intentions of the legislature,
and the practical consequences of different interpretations.
Part 2 of the article evaluates each of the interpretive doctrines
examined in part 1 and develops, as an alternative, an explicitly
“pragmatic” approach. This alternative approach builds on the words-in-
total-context doctrine by interpreting the words of the Act “in their entire
context,” having regard to the scheme of the Act, the purposes of the
Act, the intentions of Parliament, and the practical consequences of
different interpretations.
The first of the four doctrines discussed is strict construction. Its
justification is traced to a largely despotic conception of the state and
taxation, which prevailed in the 19th century. More recently, the strict
construction approach has fallen into disfavour and has been replaced by
other doctrines of interpretation with a more purposive and contextual
focus. To the extent that these other doctrines better reflect the purposes
of modern taxation and the democratic character of the modern state,
the rejection of strict construction by the Supreme Court of Canada, in
Stubart Investments Limited v. The Queen and subsequent decisions,
should not be mourned.
The second doctrine examined is purposive interpretation. A
distinction is drawn between specific legislative intentions and more
general statutory purposes, and various criticisms are discussed which
have been levelled against this interpretive approach: that it presumes the
existence of legislative intentions and statutory purposes where none
may exist, that it confers excessive discretion upon unelected judges, that
it produces questionable judgments and doctrinal confusion, and that it
contradicts the rule of law by making legal rules dependent on legislative
intentions and statutory purposes not expressed in the authoritative form
of statutory provisions. Although legislative intentions and statutory
purposes are generally determinable and relevant to statutory interpretation,
all of the other criticisms are valid objections to purposive interpretation
as it has been defined and applied in recent tax cases decided by the
Supreme Court of Canada. To the extent that purposive interpretation
downplays the words of the Act, the decisions in The Queen v. Bronfman
Trust, The Queen v. McClurg, and Neuman v. The Queen suggest that it
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enhances judicial discretion, promotes doctrinal confusion, and
undermines the rule of law.
The third doctrine considered is the plain meaning rule. This article
challenges its account of the interpretive process, its artificial emphasis
on ambiguity, and its assumptions regarding the institutional competence
of courts and legislatures. Although the emphasis of this interpretive
approach on the words of the statutory text is a salutary response to the
defects of purposive interpretation, the plain meaning rule goes too far by
ignoring the role that purposive and contextual considerations should and
necessarily do play in the interpretation of statutory words.
The fourth doctrine discussed is the words-in-total-context approach,
which is characterized as a positive synthesis of the plain meaning rule
and purposive interpretation. Beginning with MacGuigan JA’s description
of this approach in British Columbia Telephone Company v. The Queen,
the discussion focuses on the appropriate scope of contextual analysis,
considering the “internal context” of the statutory text (the words of the
provision at issue, as well as other statutory provisions and structural
features, such as headings and subdivisions, that are relevant to the
interpretation of these words), the “external context” by which the
statutory text is understood (the common understanding of the language
in which the statute is written, background assumptions as to the
purpose and subject-matter of the text, and the legal and cultural norms
of the society in which the statute is enacted and interpreted), and the
challenges to statutory interpretation arising from changed legal and
social contexts. While the various contexts that are relevant to the
interpretation of a particular provision necessarily depend on the facts of
the given case, this article argues that it is inappropriate to exclude any
relevant consideration from the scope of contextual analysis.
Following the analysis of the four doctrines, the article outlines the
essential features of an explicitly pragmatic approach to statutory
interpretation, explains the relevance of practical consequences to judicial
decisions, and considers the manner in which consequential considerations
and other relevant factors are properly brought together in the context of
a particular interpretive issue. Emphasizing the significance of textual,
purposive, and consequential considerations to statutory interpretation,
this interpretive approach favours an open and inquiring method of
judicial reasoning by which the court should endeavour, where possible,
to fashion a mutual harmony among these various interpretive elements.
Where this harmony is ultimately unachievable, however, the pragmatic
approach advocated here follows the traditional practice of English, US,
and Canadian courts by generally weighing textual considerations more
heavily than purposive considerations and purposive considerations more
heavily than consequential considerations.
To the extent that Supreme Court of Canada decisions interpreting the
Income Tax Act already examine textual, purposive, and consequential
considerations, the pragmatic approach advocated here is not so much a
departure from the court’s actual practice of statutory interpretation as a
746 CANADIAN TAX JOURNAL / REVUE FISCALE CANADIENNE
(1999), Vol. 47, No. 4 / no 4
more satisfactory account of that practice than is provided by the various
doctrines to which the court now refers. To the extent that these doctrines
shape both the process of statutory interpretation and the substance of
the decisions themselves, however, the proposed pragmatic approach
promises a more open, reasoned, and balanced method of statutory
interpretation than each of the alternatives otherwise available.
INTRODUCTION
Part 1 of this two-part article introduced the four main doctrines to which
Canadian courts have referred in interpreting the Income Tax Act1—strict
construction, purposive interpretation, the plain meaning rule, and the words-
in-total-context approach—reviewing their origins and their application in
Canadian income tax cases. While the Supreme Court of Canada has for-
mally rejected the traditional rule according to which tax statutes should be
strictly construed, it has yet to adopt a single interpretive doctrine. Instead,
it variously employs purposive interpretation, the plain meaning rule, and
the words-in-total-context approach. At the same time, aspects of strict
construction arguably remain in the literalism of the plain meaning rule
and the residual presumption in favour of the taxpayer. Notwithstanding
these doctrinal developments, the court’s actual practice of statutory in-
terpretation is implicitly pragmatic, in that it takes into account a variety
of relevant factors: the text of the provisions at issue, the scheme of the
Act, the purpose of the provisions within that scheme, the intentions of the
legislature, and the practical consequences of different interpretations.
Part 2 of the article evaluates each of the interpretive doctrines exam-
ined in part 1, outlines the essential features of an explicitly pragmatic
approach to statutory interpretation, and advances an argument for this
pragmatic approach as an alternative to the interpretive doctrines cur-
rently employed. Building upon the doctrinal analysis of part 1, part 2
examines arguments for and against each interpretive doctrine, referring
to various tax cases discussed in part 1 to illustrate the relevant argument.
To the extent that interpretive doctrines influence both the manner in
which cases are decided and the outcomes of the decisions themselves,
the pragmatic approach advocated here promises a more open, reasoned,
and balanced method of statutory interpretation than each of the alterna-
tives otherwise available.
STRICT CONSTRUCTION
Although the merits and demerits of the traditional rule that tax statutes
should be construed strictly have been discussed on numerous occasions,2
1 RSC 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended (herein referred to as “the Act”). Unless
otherwise stated, statutory references in this article are to the Act.
2 See, for example, John Willis, “Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell” (January 1938), 16
The Canadian Bar Review 1-27, at 25-27; W. Friedmann, “Statute Law and Its Interpretation
(The footnote is continued on the next page.)
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it is useful to reconsider these arguments in light of contemporary uses of
and attitudes toward taxation. As courts and commentators have noted,3 it
is changes in these uses and attitudes that led to the decline of strict
construction and the emergence of more purposive and contextual ap-
proaches to interpreting the Act. In this respect, the selection of a particular
interpretive doctrine necessarily reflects an implicit judgment with respect
to competing values at stake in the taxation of income itself.
In weighing these competing values, strict construction tended to ignore
the social purposes of taxation while emphasizing the extent to which
taxation interferes with individual liberty, the need for certainty in the
application of tax statutes, and the relative ease with which Parliament
can amend a tax statute to correct any deficiency. With respect to the
purposes of taxation, strict construction was based on a largely despotic
conception of the state, according to which, as John Willis observed,
“first Kings and then legislatures taxed the masses in order to benefit a
few court favourites.”4 Private property, in contrast, was viewed as an
essential bulwark of individual liberty.5
On this basis, it is not surprising that common law judges, who viewed
the common law as the realm of legal principle and the guardian of
individual liberty,6 “leaned against taxing Acts”7 as they did social reform
in the Modern State” (November 1948), 26 The Canadian Bar Review 1277-1300, at 1298-
99; Gwyneth McGregor, “Literal or Liberal? Trends in the Interpretation of Income Tax
Law” (March 1954), 32 The Canadian Bar Review 281-303; J.T. Thorson, “Canada,” in
International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 50a, The Inter-
pretation of Tax Laws with Special Reference to Form and Substance (London: International
Fiscal Association, 1965), 75-82; Gwyneth McGregor, “Interpretation of Taxing Statutes:
Whither Canada?” (1968), vol. 16, no. 2 Canadian Tax Journal 122-36; Douglas J.
Sherbaniuk, “Tax Avoidance—Recent Developments,” in Report of Proceedings of the
Twenty-First Tax Conference, 1968 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Founda-
tion, 1969), 430-42; and Stephen W. Bowman, “Interpretation of Tax Legislation: The
Evolution of Purposive Analysis” (1995), vol. 43, no. 5 Canadian Tax Journal 1167-89.
3 See, for example, Stubart Investments Limited v. The Queen, 84 DTC 6305, at 6323;
[1984] CTC 294, at 316 (SCC); Corporation Notre-Dame de Bon-Secours v. Communaute
Urbaine de Quebec et al., 95 DTC 5017, at 5021; [1995] 1 CTC 241, at 248 (SCC); Willis,
supra footnote 2; Friedmann, supra footnote 2; McGregor, “Literal or Liberal?” supra
footnote 2; McGregor, “Interpretation of Taxing Statutes,” supra footnote 2; and Sherbaniuk,
supra footnote 2.
4 Willis, supra footnote 2, at 25.
5 See, for example, John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1698), C.B. Mac-
pherson, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980). Strict construction stood in opposition to, and
eventually displaced, equitable construction, the interpretive approach advocated by Thomas
Hobbes and others: see the discussion in part 1 of this article at footnotes 64 to 67 and
accompanying text. On the role of Lockean political theory and the “Glorious Revolution”
of 1688 in the decline of equitable construction and its displacement by strict construction,
see J.A. Corry, “Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes” (1936), 1 Univer-
sity of Toronto Law Journal 286-312, at 295-99.
6 See, for example, Bowman, supra footnote 2, at 1173: “The traditional strict and
literal approach taken by the courts did not arise in a legal or social vacuum. The same
2 Continued . . .
(6, 7 Continued on the next page.)
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legislation,8 adopting a quasi-constitutional rule against the imposition of
any tax except by the clearest possible language.9 As the Supreme Court
of Canada stated in 1877,
[w]hen a statute derogates from a common law right and divests a party of his
property, or imposes a burthen on him, every provision of the statute ben-
eficial to him must be observed. Therefore it has been held, that acts which
impose a charge or a duty upon the subject must be construed strictly.10
Indeed, since tax legislation was regarded as “essentially an arbitrary
taking, the only purpose of which is to raise revenue,”11 a literal approach
to the interpretation of these statutes was often favoured on the grounds
that literal interpretation secured the certainty and predictability that tax-
payers required in order to plan their commercial and personal affairs
with the least possible interference from the taxation authorities. As Ruth
Sullivan explains,
judges who developed and applied the general principles applicable to such interpretive
issues spent the greater part of their careers dealing with legal issues arising outside the
field of taxation. Indeed, much of their time, and undoubtedly most if not all of their
training, was devoted to the study, advocacy, and judging of matters arising in the tradi-
tional non-statutory judge-made law developed by the common law courts and the courts
of equity. For such judges, laws created by statute were the exception to the general rule
that law emanated from the accumulated decisions of the courts.” For an excellent example
of this emphasis on common law methods of reasoning, see Pryce v. Monmouthshire Canal
and Railway Companies (1878), 4 App. Cas. 197, at 202-3 (HL), in which the court
justified the strict construction of taxing statutes on the grounds that “inasmuch as there
was not any a priori liability in a subject to pay any particular tax, nor any antecedent
relationship between the tax-payer and the taxing authority, no reasoning founded upon
any supposed relationship of the tax-payer and the taxing authority could be brought to
bear upon the construction of the Act.”
7 Willis, supra footnote 2, at 25.
8 See Cass R. Sunstein, “Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State” (December 1989),
103 Harvard Law Review 407-505, at 408-9.
9 See, for example, Corporation Notre-Dame de Bon-Secours, supra footnote 3, at 5021;
248: “The rule was based on the fact that, like penal legislation, tax legislation imposes a
burden on individuals and accordingly no one should be made subject to it unless the
wording of the Act so provides in a clear and precise manner.” For a recent analysis of
interpretive presumptions as quasi-constitutional rules, see William N. Eskridge Jr. and
Philip P. Frickey, “Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional
Lawmaking” (April 1992), 45 Vanderbilt Law Review 593-646. For an early appreciation of
this quasi-constitutional character of judicial presumptions, see Willis, supra footnote 2, at 17-23.
10 Nicholls v. Cumming (1877), 1 SCR 395, at 422. See also The Canadian Northern
Ry. Co. v. The King, (1922), 64 SCR 264, at 275, in which the court stated that tax legislation
“should always be construed strictly against the taxing authorities, since it restricts the
public in the enjoyment of its property”; and Morguard Properties Ltd. v. City of Winnipeg
(1983), 3 DLR (4th) 1, at 13 (SCC), where the court stated that “the courts require that, in
order to adversely affect a citizen’s right, whether as a taxpayer or otherwise, the Legisla-
ture must do so expressly. . . . [T]he courts must look for express language in the statute
before concluding that these rights have been reversed.”
11 Ruth Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3d ed. (Markham, Ont.:
Butterworths, 1994), 401, referring to Lord Halsbury’s decision in Tennant v. Smith, [1892]
AC 150 (HL).
6, 7 Continued . . .
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[t]he more arbitrary the content of the legislation, the more important it is
for subjects to be able to rely on certain and stable forms. . . . To minimize
the arbitrariness in such legislation, it was important to stick to whatever
clear core of meaning was evident in the words.12
In any event, as the Supreme Court of Canada observed in 1983, since the
legislature “has complete control of the process of legislation, and when
it has not for any reason clearly expressed itself, it has all the resources
available to correct that inadequacy of expression,” the courts should “be
slow to presume oversight or inarticulate intentions when the rights of
citizens are involved.”13
In contrast to strict construction, contemporary approaches to the inter-
pretation of tax legislation emphasize the democratic character of the
modern state,14 the role of taxation in redistributing resources and financ-
ing the public goods and services provided by this modern state,15 and the
purposes of modern tax statutes both to distribute these taxes in an equi-
table manner and to encourage specific kinds of social and economic
behaviour.16 In this light, as one commentator observed,
[t]axation has ceased to be regarded . . . as an impertinent intrusion into the
sacred rights of private property and it is now rightly regarded as a vital
instrument of State policy in securing a proper balance between the citi-
zen’s claim to the enjoyment of property and the social purpose of assisting
the provision of essential social services, through the equitable distribution
of burdens in the community.17
12 Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 401 and 404. For other references to the values of
certainty and predictability as justifications for the strict construction of taxing statutes,
see Thorson, supra footnote 2, at 79; and Sherbaniuk, supra footnote 2, at 436-37.
13 Morguard Properties Ltd., supra footnote 10, at 12. See also Thorson, supra footnote 2,
at 79, commenting on the distinction between “the Canadian view that the letter of the law
should govern in a taxing Act and that taken by the Courts in the United States that the
true intent of the taxing Act should be deduced and applied accordingly.” Thorson suggests
as one reason for this difference the fact that “it is much easier to amend fiscal legislation in
Canada than it is in the United States with the result that desirable fiscal legislation reform
can be accomplished more easily and quickly in Canada than in the United States.” Ibid.
14 See, for example, Corry, supra footnote 5, at 289, emphasizing the importance of
“intelligent judicial co-operation” in a parliamentary democracy in “the fulfilment of the
aims and objects of parliament.”
15 See, for example, Sherbaniuk, supra footnote 2, at 436, noting that income taxation
“is not simply a method of raising revenue to enable government to provide certain public
goods and services such as defence, roads and education; it is also a means for funding the
welfare state, for re-distributing wealth . . . and for regulating the economy.”
16 See, for example, Friedmann, supra footnote 2, at 1298, referring to “the equitable
distribution of burdens in the community”; and McGregor, “Literal or Liberal?” supra
footnote 2, at 283: “In recent years . . . a change has been taking place in the function and
application of taxing statutes. They are no longer mere tax collecting agencies, for they
are used also as economic and social weapons—to combat inflation, to discourage some
types of business activities and consumer purchases and to encourage others, to promote
the development of natural resources, to advance scientific research and social welfare
schemes, and so on.”
17 Friedmann, supra footnote 2, at 1298.
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Moreover, as the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal has stated,
the purposes and objectives of taxing statutes have changed from simply
raising revenue to playing an important role in encouraging economic growth
and directing economic and fiscal policy. An examination of the Act reveals
a range of non-revenue provisions. These are as varied as providing incen-
tives for personal savings in the forms of registered retirement savings
plans, to influencing business decisions made in the marketplace under the
guise of investment tax credits. The theory that revenue statutes are solely
for the purpose of collecting revenue is obsolete.18
As a result, as another critic of strict construction concluded, the “view
of taxation as interference with proprietary rights reflects the laissez-faire
economics of the latter part of the 19th century but is hardly consonant
with contemporary thinking about the purposes of taxation.”19 On the
contrary, as Estey J affirmed in Stubart Investments Limited v. The Queen,
“the taxpayer’s freedom to carry on his commercial and social affairs
however he may choose” must be balanced against “the state interest in
revenue, equity in the raising of the revenue, and economic planning.”20
From this perspective, a rule requiring the courts to interpret tax stat-
utes strictly, without regard to any purpose other than the collection of
revenue, contradicts not only the actual purposes of modern tax legisla-
tion to distribute tax burdens equitably and promote social and economic
policies, but also the most basic principles of a democratic society in
which the unelected judicial branch is largely subordinate to the elected
legislature.21 Not surprisingly, therefore, where Canadian courts have con-
strued the Income Tax Act strictly,22 they have tended to frustrate both the
objects of specific statutory provisions to prevent tax avoidance or ac-
count for differences in taxpayers’ relative abilities to pay, and the most
plausible intention of Parliament to distribute tax burdens in an equitable
manner.23 Indeed, to the extent that strict construction allowed taxpayers
to insist on a literal reading of taxing provisions, this interpretive approach
18 Royal Bank of Canada v. Saskatchewan Power Corp. (1990), 73 DLR (4th) 257, at 264
(Sask. CA).
19 Sherbaniuk, supra footnote 2, at 436.
20 Supra footnote 3, at 6321; 314. For a useful review of the expanded purposes of
taxation identified in Stubart, see David Crerar, “Interpretations of GAAR: Before and
Beyond McNichol and RMM,” Case Comment feature (Fall 1997), 23 Queen’s Law Journal
231-57, at 236-45.
21 See, for example, Willis, supra footnote 2, at 17, explaining that resort to old pre-
sumptions to interpret statutes in the 20th century “no longer [has] anything to do with the
intent of the legislature; they are a means of controlling that intent.”
22 See the cases discussed in part 1 of this article at footnotes 18 to 45 and accompany-
ing text.
23 See, for example, Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 406: “Although fiscal legislation is
arbitrary in the sense that other persons or property could have been chosen to pay the tax,
the allocation of tax burden is never haphazard. Choices about which person and property
are subject to tax and how much revenue should be raised generally are grounded in
specific moral, political or economic views.”
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actually facilitated tax-avoidance schemes whereby taxpayers might enter
into transactions or arrangements solely or primarily for the purpose of
minimizing the tax burdens to which they would otherwise be subject.24
As for the values of certainty and predictability, it is unclear whether
strict construction produced greater or lesser certainty in the application
of the Act. Indeed, when statutory provisions were read literally, without
regard to their context or purpose, judicial interpretations were often less
certain and predictable than they might have been had the courts used a
more contextual approach to statutory interpretation. As Stephen Bowman
has suggested, referring to two cases in which statutory rules attributing
income from one spouse to another were strictly construed,25 the outcomes
“were perhaps not entirely predictable by a person attempting to read the
sections and determine the manner in which they would apply in practice.”26
Finally, as critics have observed, while tax statutes might be amended
to reverse judicial decisions considered unacceptable by the legislature,
because these amendments are rarely retroactive, their effectiveness in
discouraging tax avoidance is impaired.27 More generally, as critics have
also concluded, these amendments have greatly increased the length and
complexity of the Income Tax Act, making it largely inaccessible to most
persons to whom it applies.28 In fact, as Bowman explains, “[t]he process
becomes self-perpetuating”: “[d]etailed legislative provisions invite the
courts to conclude that the treatment of the subject is exhaustive, and that
the legislation is meant to say exactly what it says and does not mean to say
anything that it omits,” while drafters respond “with increasing frequency to
plug the gaps exposed by restrictive interpretations by the courts.”29 The
result, as Bowman emphasizes, is “the creation over time of increasingly
wide areas of law where even experienced practitioners must defer to
24 See, for example, Sherbaniuk, supra footnote 2, at 430-31, describing strict and
literal construction of taxing statutes as one of the two “pillars of tax planning”—the other
being the traditional rule that tax consequences were to be determined according to the
legal relationships validly created by the parties to a transaction or arrangement, rather
than the economic substance of the transaction or arrangement. See also Sullivan, supra
footnote 11, at 403-4, discussing the role of literalism in tax-avoidance schemes.
25 MNR v. MacInnes, 54 DTC 1031; [1954] CTC 50 (Ex. Ct.); and Robins v. MNR, 63
DTC 1012; [1963] CTC 27 (Ex. Ct.). These cases are discussed in part 1 of this article in
the text accompanying footnotes 21 to 26 and 29 to 31, respectively.
26 Bowman, supra footnote 2, at 1183.
27 See, for example, Crerar, supra footnote 20, at 239, mentioning the absence of retro-
activity as a reason why enactment of the general anti-avoidance rule in section 245 was
“necessary.”
28 See, for example, Sherbaniuk, supra footnote 2, at 439: “the stricter the construction
of statutory language, the more the need for detailed specific provisions, and the greater
the likelihood of creating a hopelessly complex, unmanageable labyrinth.” See also Sullivan,
supra footnote 11, at 409: “At least some of the prolixity and excessive detail of fiscal
legislation has been caused by the need to overcome the courts’ traditional reluctance to
assist the legislature in its efforts to raise revenue.”
29 Bowman, supra footnote 2, at 1183-84.
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specialists who are able to devote substantial time and energy to mastering
the provisions.”30 As a result, he concludes:
If one of the goals of legislation is to be readily comprehensible by the
largest percentage of those affected as is practical in view of the nature of
the legislation, the traditional strict and literal approach has not achieved
that goal.31
In this light, one might reasonably expect the courts to abandon their
traditional antagonism toward taxing statutes, adopting a more critical
view of tax-avoidance schemes32 and rejecting the traditional rule accord-
ing to which tax statutes were to be strictly construed. Indeed, while the
Supreme Court of Canada continues to affirm that taxpayers can, absent
specific statutory provisions, “arrange their affairs in a particular way for
the sole purpose” of minimizing tax,33 this traditional rule is subject to the
“object and spirit” test set out in Stubart,34 occasional references to “com-
mercial and economic reality,”35 and the general anti-avoidance rule enacted
in 1988.36 Likewise, although traces of strict construction arguably linger
in the literalism of the plain meaning rule and the residual presumption in
favour of the taxpayer,37 the Supreme Court has largely rejected this doc-
trine, referring in Stubart to “the demise of the strict interpretation rule
30 Ibid., at 1184.
31 Ibid.
32 See, for example, Friedmann, supra footnote 2, at 1298, suggesting that “[a]voidance
of tax is now seen as an improper advantage gained by an individual taxpayer at the
expense of the community”; and McGregor, “Literal or Liberal?” supra footnote 2, at 283,
observing that “the extent of modern taxation and its high rates have led to a growing
feeling that every citizen should pay his full share and that no one should be permitted to
avoid any part of his liability even by means that are technically within the law.”
33 See, for example, Neuman v. The Queen, 98 DTC 6297, at 6302; [1998] 3 CTC 177,
at 188 (SCC).
34 Stubart, supra footnote 3, at 6324; 317. According to this test, the “formal validity”
of a transaction may be “insufficient” where “ ‘the object and spirit’ of [an] allowance or
benefit provision is defeated by . . . procedures blatantly adopted by [a] taxpayer to synthe-
size a loss, delay or other tax saving device, although these actions may not attain the
height of ‘artificiality.’ ” Although recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions appear to
have downplayed this “object and spirit” test, it has not been explicitly rejected. See, for
example, Antosko et al. v. The Queen, 94 DTC 6314; [1994] 2 CTC 25 (SCC); and Duha
Printers (Western) Ltd. v. The Queen, 98 DTC 6334; [1998] 3 CTC 303 (SCC).
35 See, for example, The Queen v. Bronfman Trust, 87 DTC 5059, at 5066-67; [1987] 1
CTC 117, at 128 (SCC); and the majority decision in The Queen v. McClurg, 91 DTC
5001, at 5010; [1991] 1 CTC 169, at 183 (SCC). While Supreme Court of Canada deci-
sions such as Antosko, supra footnote 34, appear to have downplayed reliance on the
commercial or economic substance of transactions as a general principle, it is arguable
that commercial and economic reality remains relevant to the application of several statu-
tory provisions, such as the interest deduction in subparagraph 20(1)(c)(i) and the anti-
avoidance rule in subsection 56(2).
36 See section 245 of the Act, enacted by SC 1988, c. 55, section 185, generally appli-
cable with respect to transactions entered into on or after September 13, 1988.
37 See the discussion in part 1 of this article at footnotes 85 to 98 and accompanying text.
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for the construction of taxing statutes”38 and concluding in The Queen v.
Golden et al. that
[s]trict construction in the historic sense no longer finds a place in the
canons of interpretation applicable to taxation statutes in an era such as the
present, where taxation serves many purposes in addition to the old and
traditional object of raising the cost of government from a somewhat unen-
thusiastic public.39
To the extent that contemporary interpretive doctrines better reflect the
purposes of modern taxation and the principles of a democratic society,
the “demise” of strict construction should not be mourned.
PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION
As explained in part 1 of this article, modern purposive interpretation
originates in the writings of legal realists like John Willis and the legisla-
tive reforms of the modern administrative state.40 To the extent that the
former criticized formalist approaches to legal reasoning, while the latter
encouraged a purposive approach to the interpretation of broad regulatory
schemes, the arguments in favour of purposive interpretation mirror those
against strict construction.
Above all, as Willis wrote, purposive interpretation, in contrast to the
literalism and presumptions of strict construction, accords with the con-
stitutional principle of legislative supremacy.41 By interpreting the Income
Tax Act not strictly, but in light of “the scheme of the Act, the object of
the Act, and the intention of Parliament,” courts do not frustrate legisla-
tive intentions and statutory purposes, but cooperate in the fulfilment of
these aims and objects in a manner consistent with the proper role of an
unelected judiciary in a democratic society.42 Moreover, as critics of strict
construction have observed, a more purposive approach to the interpreta-
tion of the Act is likely to lessen opportunities for abusive tax avoidance43
38 Supra footnote 3, at 6323; 316.
39 86 DTC 6138, at 6140; [1986] 1 CTC 274, at 277 (SCC).
40 See the discussion in part 1 of this article at footnotes 105 to 107 and accompanying text.
41 Willis, supra footnote 2, at 14. See also James M. Landis, “A Note on ‘Statutory Inter-
pretation’ ” (April 1930), 43 Harvard Law Review 886-93, at 886, noting that an emphasis
on legislative intent derives from the “Anglo-American scheme of government [which] con-
ceived of lawgivers apart from and at times paramount over courts”; Harry Willmer Jones,
“Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention” (June 1940), 40 Columbia Law Review 957-74,
at 965, emphasizing that “[i]n our legal and political theory . . . the originative function of law-
making is the province of the legislative department”; and Archibald Cox, “Judge Learned
Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes” (1947), 60 Harvard Law Review 370-93, at 372,
observing that “[u]nder our traditions the judge’s role, while final, is still subordinate.”
42 See supra footnote 14.
43 See, for example, Sherbaniuk, supra footnote 2, at 438: “Flagrant cases of tax avoidance,
which may succeed because of strict interpretation of the Act, can bring the tax system
into disrepute. Not only are dollars lost to the revenue, but other taxpayers are emboldened
to imitate these efforts, and new avoidance schemes are spawned. The tax system can
function soundly only if there is a conviction that the burden is fairly apportioned.”
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and reduce the need for lengthy and complex drafting and amendments to
counteract inappropriate judicial decisions.44
Despite these apparent advantages, however, purposive interpretation
has also been criticized on the grounds that it presumes the existence of
legislative intentions and statutory purposes where none may exist, that it
confers excessive discretion upon unelected judges, that it produces ques-
tionable judgments and doctrinal confusion, and that it contradicts the
rule of law by making legal rules dependent on legislative intentions and
statutory purposes not expressed in the authoritative form of statutory
provisions.
This section examines each of these criticisms, rejecting the first but
accepting the other three as legitimate objections to the manner in which
the Supreme Court of Canada has defined and applied purposive interpre-
tation in recent tax cases.45 While these criticisms do not preclude attention
to legislative intentions and statutory purposes in interpreting the mean-
ing of statutory provisions, they call into question the key tenet of
purposive interpretation: that in determining the meaning of a statutory
provision, “the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention
of Parliament” have priority over the words of the provision.
Legislative Intentions and Statutory Purposes
Many commentators have analyzed the distinction between legislative
intentions and statutory purposes and their respective roles in statutory
interpretation.46 On the basis of this literature, one can define the concept of
legislative intent as the specific meaning that the legislature or a majority
of the legislature would give to a statute or provision in the context of a
particular fact situation,47 while statutory purpose refers to the more general
44 See, for example, Bowman, supra footnote 2, at 1184, commenting that “if the pur-
posive approach results in greater conformity of judicial results to legislative purposes,
there should at least be a reduction in the volume of legislation designed to remedy judicial
action, and perhaps over the long term the adoption of a plainer style of legislative drafting.”
45 For an analysis of these cases, see part 1 of this article at footnotes 111 to 193 and
accompanying text.
46 See, for example, Landis, supra footnote 41; Cox, supra footnote 41; Jones, supra
footnote 41; Gerald C. MacCallum, “Legislative Intent” (April 1966), 75 Yale Law Journal
754-87; and Reed Dickerson, “Statutory Interpretation: A Peek into the Mind and Will of
a Legislature” (Winter 1975), 50 Indiana Law Journal 206-37. For more recent considera-
tions, see Earl M. Maltz, “Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a
Modified Intentionalist Approach” (November 1988), 63 Tulane Law Review 1-28; and
Frank H. Easterbrook, “The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction” (Winter
1988), 11 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 59-66.
47 See, for example, Landis, supra footnote 41, at 888, defining legislative intent, nar-
rowly understood, as the “immediate concept of meaning” contemplated by the legislature;
Cox, supra footnote 41, at 371, defining legislative intent in terms of “the specific particular-
ized application which the statute was ‘intended’ to be given”; and Dickerson, supra footnote
46, at 208, defining intent as “the specific message that the user intended to convey.”
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goals or policies at which the statute or provision is aimed.48 Although
these concepts shade into one another, they are nonetheless distinguish-
able to the extent that the latter inheres not in the mind of any one
individual or collective body but in the statutory scheme to which the
legislature has given life.
Given these definitions of legislative intent and statutory purpose, it is
not difficult to see why the existence of the former might be questioned.
To the extent that legislators are unlikely to accord identical meanings to
statutory provisions, and may not even be familiar with the details of the
legislation they enact, it is often argued that the intent of a legislative
body is a legal fiction that is not only unknowable in practice but
unachievable in principle.49 Moreover, as commentators have observed,
since the particular circumstances to which a statute or provision is ap-
plied are often unforeseen at the time of enactment, it is impossible in
these cases to speak of any actual legislative intent even if it were possi-
ble to determine the intent of a collective body.50
In addition to these traditional objections, more recent critics have also
questioned the existence of any coherent statutory purposes according to
which courts might interpret statutory provisions. Inspired by contempo-
rary theories of the legislative process that emphasize the role of individual
48 See, for example, Cox, supra footnote 41, at 370, describing the purpose of legisla-
tion as “the general aim or policy which pervades the statute but has yet to find specific
application.” See also Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 45: “When interpreters refer to the aim
or object of legislation or its goals, they usually mean the primary social, economic or political
effects that the legislature hoped to produce through the operation of the legislation.”
49 See, for example, Max Radin, “Statutory Interpretation” (April 1930), 43 Harvard
Law Review 863-85, at 870: “A legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connec-
tion with words which some two or three men drafted, which a considerable number
rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving majority might have had, and often
demonstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs. . . . The chances that of several hun-
dred men each will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind as possible
reductions of a given determinable, are infinitesimally small.” See also Jones, supra foot-
note 41, at 968, concluding that “[i]f legislative ‘intention’ is supposed to signify a
construction placed upon statutory language by every individual member of the two enact-
ing houses, it is, obviously, a concept of purely fictitious status”; Willis, supra footnote 2,
at 3, explaining that “[t]he expression [“the intent of the legislature”] does not refer to
actual intent—a composite body can hardly have a single intent”; and Corry, supra foot-
note 5, at 290, noting that “[e]ven the majority who vote for complex legislation do not
have any common intention as to its detailed provisions. Their vote indicates party dra-
gooning rather than approval and appreciation of the measure.” For a more recent statement
of this position, see Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Congress Is a ‘They,’ Not an ‘It’: Legislative
Intent as Oxymoron” (June 1992), 12 International Review of Law and Economics 239-56.
50 See, for example, Cox, supra footnote 41, at 371-72: “Few, if any, legislators think in
terms of the specific controversies which courts must settle by giving a statute one or another
meaning. Many such controversies cannot be foreseen because they spring from circumstances
which no one can anticipate when enacting legislation. In consequence, the charge is easily
and often made that the courts which purport to seek out the legislative intent in doubtful cases
indulge themselves in a shameless fiction devised, consciously or in self-deception, to cloak
the fact that they are not interpreting, but making law according to their own notions.”
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incentives and voting rules in influencing legislative outcomes,51 these
critics view legislative enactments as unprincipled and largely unpredict-
able deals or compromises among legislative actors (for whom the primary
purpose of any statute is the personal goal of re-election) and well-organized
interest groups (seeking public benefits or “rents” at the expense of less
well-organized interests).52 On this basis, US Judge Frank Easterbrook
has argued, “It is not only impossible to reason from one statute to another
but also impossible to reason from one or more sections of a statute to a
problem not resolved.”53 On the contrary, he contends, since “compromises
lack ‘spirit,’ ”54 statutes should be interpreted strictly to avoid “upsetting
the balance” of the deal.55
Although the concepts of legislative intention and statutory purpose
are by no means straightforward, it is implausible to suggest that they do
not exist at all. On the contrary, while the characterization of these inten-
tions and purposes is itself an interpretive enterprise, these elements of
statutory meaning are neither wholly imaginary nor thoroughly inaccessible.
With respect to the traditional objections that legislative intent may not
exist, advocates of purposive interpretation have offered two responses.
First, to the extent that legislative majorities either concur with or acquiesce
in the views of those most closely associated with drafting or sponsoring
a particular statute or amendment, the effective intent of the legislature
may be identified with the actual intent of these specific individuals.56 On
51 Among the leading works in this body of “public choice” theory are James M.
Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Consti-
tutional Democracy (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1962); Kenneth J.
Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1963); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965); and William H. Riker, Liber-
alism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory
of Social Choice (San Francisco: Freeman, 1982). For a useful overview of these theories,
see D.C. Mueller, Public Choice II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
52 For useful summaries of public choice theory and its implications for statutory inter-
pretation, see William N. Eskridge Jr., “Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation” (March 1988), 74 Virginia Law Review 275-
338; Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, “Legislative Intent and Public Choice” (March
1988), 74 Virginia Law Review 423-69; and Edward L. Rubin, “Beyond Public Choice:
Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes” (April 1991), 66 New
York University Law Review 1-64. For a recent analysis of the implications of public choice
theory for statutory interpretation in Canada, see Paul Horwitz, “Judicial Romanticism, Pub-
lic Choice and Parliamentary History” (unpublished paper on file with author, 1997).
53 Frank H. Easterbrook, “Statutes’ Domains” (Spring 1983), 50 University of Chicago
Law Review 533-52, at 547.
54 Ibid., at 541.
55 Ibid., at 540: “What matters to the compromisers is reducing the chance that their
work will be invoked subsequently to achieve more, or less, than they intended, thereby
upsetting the balance of the package.”
56 See, for example, Landis, supra footnote 41, at 888-89; Jones, supra footnote 41, at
968-70; and Dickerson, supra footnote 46, at 210-13. See also John M. Kernochan, “Statutory
(The footnote is continued on the next page.)
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this basis, it follows, evidence of legislative intent may be discerned not
only in the statutory texts that the legislature enacts, but also in the so-
called legislative history of a statute, consisting of committee reports,
legislative debates, and other authoritative statements accompanying the
introduction of new legislation.57 In addition, where the Act has been
subject to legislative amendment, legislative intentions may reasonably
be inferred by tracing “the evolution of legislation from its inception,
through successive amendments, to its current form.”58
Second, and more generally, although legislators may not have a spe-
cific intent concerning the manner in which a statute or provision ought
to apply to concrete cases, they and the statutes that they enact can be
said to have more general purposes to which courts might reasonably be
expected to defer when interpreting a statute or provision in the context
of a particular fact situation.59 On this account, as US Judge Learned
Hand advised, courts should endeavour to imagine how legislators, pursu-
ing these purposes, would have resolved a particular issue had it been
presented to them when the statutory provision was enacted.60 While these
Interpretation: An Outline of Method” (1976-77), 3 The Dalhousie Law Journal 331-66, at
347: “It is practicable and realistic in relation to purposes and even to details of legislation
that the views of those to whom the legislators delegate responsibility should be taken as
standing for the views of the legislature.”
57 See, for example, Landis, supra footnote 41, at 888-90. For a useful review of
arguments for and against the “authority value” of legislative history as evidence of “spe-
cific legislative intent,” see William N. Eskridge Jr., “Legislative History Values” (1990),
vol. 66, no. 2 Chicago-Kent Law Review 365-440, at 369-91.
58 Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 58.
59 See, for example, Corry, supra footnote 5, at 292: “Though the intention of the
legislature is a fiction, the purpose or object of the legislation is very real. No enactment
is ever passed for the sake of its details; it is passed in an attempt to realize a social
purpose. It is what is variously called the aim and object of the enactment, the spirit of the
legislation, the mischief and the remedy. . . . In part it is to be inferred from the discussion
of the bill in committee and in the house, in part from the prior legislative history of the
measure, and in part from general history and the trend of social forces.” Among the
leading exponents of this purposive approach to statutory interpretation are Henry M. Hart
and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of
Law, tentative ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Law School, 1958), who argue (at 1156) that
“every statute must be conclusively presumed to be a purposive act” and (at 1415) statutes
should be interpreted as the products of “reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes
reasonably.” See also Jones, supra footnote 41, at 973, suggesting that “in determining the
effect of a statute in cases of interpretive doubt, the judge should decide in such a way as will
advance the general objectives which, in his judgment, the legislators sought by enactment
of the legislation”; and Kernochan, supra footnote 56, at 353, emphasizing that “[l]egislation,
like other utterances, is a purposive act and the effort must be to reconstruct the purpose
that propelled the lawgivers if meaning is to be assigned faithfully and intelligently.”
60 Borella v. Borden Co., 145 F.2d 63, at 64 (2d Cir. 1944) (aff ’d. 325 US 679 (1945)):
“We can best reach the meaning here, as always, by recourse to the underlying purpose,
and with that as a guide, by trying to project upon the specific occasion how we think
persons, actuated by such a purpose, would have dealt with it, if it had been presented to
them at the time.” For an excellent summary of Judge Learned Hand’s approach to the
56 Continued . . .
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purposes are often varied and conflicting,61 and may be described at dif-
ferent levels of generality,62 they may nonetheless play a useful role in
statutory interpretation. Moreover, for this purpose, judicial attention to
legislative history and legislative evolution may be justified less for what
it may say about specific legislative intentions than for what it might
suggest about the reasons why a statute or amendment was enacted and
the objects at which the statute or provision aims.63 In other cases, statutory
interpretation of statutes, see Cox, supra footnote 41. For a more recent exposition of this
interpretive approach, see Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 273, referring to this purposive method as “imagina-
tive reconstruction.” For critical evaluations of this “archaeological” approach, emphasizing
instead the dynamic character of statutory interpretation, see Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1986), 313-54; William N. Eskridge Jr., “Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation” (July 1987), 135 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1479-1555;
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, “Updating Statutory Interpretation” (October 1988), 87 Michigan
Law Review 20-66; and William N. Eskridge Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994). This issue is discussed further below under the
heading “Words-in-Total Context Approach—Changed Contexts.”
61 See, for example, Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 47: “The primary goals of legisla-
tion are almost never pursued single-mindedly or whole-heartedly. A number of secondary
principles and policies are usually considered important enough to be included in the
legislative plan. Others may be introduced by the drafter, pursuant to government or legisla-
tive directives. These secondary purposes may complement and facilitate pursuit of the
primary goals, or they may conflict with those goals or hinder their free pursuit.” As
indicated earlier, for example (supra footnotes 14 to 20 and accompanying text), the income
tax is designed (1) to raise revenue, (2) to distribute the tax burden in an equitable manner,
and (3) to promote specific social and economic policies. While the first and second
objectives may be compatible, the second (equity) often conflicts with the first (revenue
raising) to the extent that it necessitates deductions and credits to account for the costs of
earning income and the personal circumstances of the taxpayer. Likewise, while the sec-
ond and third objectives may be compatible where social and economic policies are designed
to accommodate differences in taxable capacities, the third objective (public policy) often
conflicts with the second (equity) to the extent that these policies favour some taxpayers
but not others, and it typically conflicts with the first objective (revenue raising) by
providing financial incentives in the form of deductions, credits, or other tax advantages.
62 See Hart and Sacks, supra footnote 59, at 1414, observing that purposes exist in
“hierarchies and constellations” ranging from very specific goals, such as the prohibition
of some activity, to more abstract purposes, such as the promotion of the public good. A
good example is the anti-avoidance rule in subsection 56(2). The purpose of this rule can
be characterized (1) narrowly, as in the majority decision in McClurg, supra footnote 35,
at 5011; 183-84, as being “to prevent avoidance by the taxpayer, through the direction to
a third party, of receipts which he or she would otherwise have obtained”; (2) more broadly,
as in Neuman, supra footnote 33, at 6301; 187, as being “to prevent tax avoidance through
income splitting”; or (3) more generally still, as being to ensure the collection of revenues
and the equitable distribution of the tax burden through the prevention of tax avoidance.
63 See, for example, Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 57-59. See also Karl Llewellyn,
“Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes
Are To Be Construed” (April 1950), 3 Vanderbilt Law Review 395-406, at 400, character-
izing references to legislative intent as “reasonably realistic” in this sense and concluding
that “committee reports, legislative debate, historical knowledge of contemporary thinking
or campaigning which points up the evil or the goal can have a significance”; Cox, supra
60 Continued . . .
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purposes may be inferred directly by reading the statutory text in the
context of the scheme of the Act.64
Although English and Canadian courts traditionally excluded extrinsic
evidence derived from the legislative history of a statute or amendment,65
they have long recognized the relevance of legislative evolution and the
statutory scheme in statutory interpretation.66 In Golden, for example, a
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada considered both the evolution
footnote 41, at 379: “[w]hatever the dangers may be in the use of such materials to reveal
the specific meaning of a statute on a particular occasion, they cause few difficulties when
used only to disclose the general purpose, for while any interpretation which they contain
may be that of only a few individuals, they are likely to reflect with sufficient accuracy
the policy adopted”; and Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 430, concluding that “legislative
history provides a sense of the context and purpose of a statutory enactment, which . . .
can provide important interpretive help.” For a useful review of arguments for and against
the “purpose value” of legislative history, see Eskridge, supra footnote 57, at 391-417.
64 See Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 54-57.
65 In England, the exclusionary rule is generally traced to Millar v. Taylor (1769), 98 ER
201, at 217 (KB), in which the court concluded that “the sense and meaning of an Act of
Parliament must be collected from what it says when passed into a law; and not from the
history of changes it underwent in the house where it took its rise.” Among Canadian state-
ments of the rule, see Gosselin v. The King (1903), 33 SCR 255, at 264, per Taschereau CJ;
and Atty Gen. of Canada v. Reader’s Digest Assoc. (Canada) Ltd., [1961] SCR 775, at 782,
per Kerwin CJ. For excellent analyses of the history and structure of this exclusionary
rule, see D.G. Kilgour, “The Rule Against the Use of Legislative History: ‘Canon of
Construction or Counsel of Caution’?” (October 1952), 30 The Canadian Bar Review 769-
90; Gordon Bale, “Parliamentary Debates and Statutory Interpretation: Switching on the
Light or Rummaging in the Ashcans of the Legislative Process” (March 1995), 74 The
Canadian Bar Review 1-28; and Stéphane Beaulac, “Parliamentary Debates in Statutory
Interpretation” (1998), 43 McGill Law Journal 287-324. In contrast to English and Cana-
dian courts, US courts have long recognized the role of legislative history in statutory
interpretation, though the extent of its use has been subject to considerable criticism in
recent years. See Eskridge, supra footnote 57. For criticisms of reliance on legislative
history by US courts, see Kenneth W. Starr, “Observations About the Use of Legislative
History” [June 1987] Duke Law Journal 371-79; Frank H. Easterbrook, “What Does Leg-
islative History Tell Us?” (1990), vol. 66, no. 2 Chicago-Kent Law Review 441-50; Note,
“Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today” (March 1992), 105
Harvard Law Review 1005-24; and Frank H. Easterbrook, “Text, History, and Structure in
Statutory Interpretation” (Winter 1994), 17 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 61-70.
For recent arguments favouring the use of legislative history, see Nicholas S. Zeppos,
“Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of
Statutory Interpretation” (October 1990), 76 Virginia Law Review 1295-1374; Stephen
Breyer, “On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes” (January 1992), 65
Southern California Law Review 845-74; and W. David Slawson, “Legislative History and
the Need To Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law” (January 1992), 44
Stanford Law Review 383-427. For an excellent analysis of the role of legislative history
in the interpretation of the US Internal Revenue Code, see Michael Livingston, “Congress,
the Courts and the Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes” (March
1991), 69 Texas Law Review 819-87. See also Paul L. Caron, “Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t
Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be Tax Lawyers” (Winter 1994), 13 Virginia Tax Review
517-90, at 531-54.
66 See Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 58-59 and 449-59 (referring to legislative evolu-
tion) and 56-57 (referring to the statutory scheme).
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of section 68 of the Act and the scheme of the Act as a whole to conclude
that this provision as it then read applied to the transaction at issue.67
More recently, English and Canadian courts appear to have rejected the
traditional rule excluding legislative history68 and are increasingly willing
to consider such extrinsic materials as evidence of legislative intentions
and statutory purposes.69 In Symes v. The Queen et al.,70 for example, the
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada cited the white paper preceding
the enactment of the child-care expense deduction in section 63 to support
its conclusion that the taxpayer could not deduct child-care expenses in
computing her business income under the general rules in subdivision b
of the Act.71 In other income tax cases, the Federal Court of Appeal has
referred to budget statements and Department of Finance technical notes
accompanying the release of draft legislation.72 While the partisan nature
of parliamentary debates and budget statements suggests that these mate-
rials should be considered cautiously,73 this is less true of other materials
like technical notes, which represent a more impartial effort to convey the
intended meaning and purpose of legislative amendments.74 In either case,
67 See the analysis of the Golden case in part 1 of this article at footnotes 291 to 316 and
accompanying text.
68 In the United Kingdom, the traditional exclusionary rule was rejected in Pepper v.
Hart, [1993] 1 All ER 42 (HL). In Canada, the rule was rejected in R v. Morgentaler,
[1993] 3 SCR 463.
69 See Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 431-49.
70 94 DTC 6001; [1994] 1 CTC 40 (SCC).
71 See the analysis of the Symes case in part 1 of this article at footnotes 317 to 352 and
accompanying text. While the minority opinion acknowledged Parliament’s intention at
the time of the white paper “to permit a tax deduction for child care expenses, under
carefully controlled terms” (ibid., at 6019-20; 65-66, citing E.J. Benson, Proposals for Tax
Reform (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1969), paragraph 2.7 [emphasis added by the
court]), it questioned any specific intention to preclude the deduction of child-care expenses
as a business expense on the grounds that, at the time, these expenses were generally
considered to be of a personal nature.
72 See Lor-Wes Contracting Ltd. v. The Queen, 85 DTC 5310; [1985] 2 CTC 79 (FCA),
in which MacGuigan JA referred to the budget statement of June 23, 1975 to support his
conclusion that the taxpayer, which carried on a contracting business building logging
roads for logging companies, was eligible for an investment tax credit under subsection
127(5) on the basis that the property was “used” by the taxpayer “primarily for the purpose
of . . . logging”; and Maritime Telephone and Telegraph Company, Limited v. The Queen,
92 DTC 6191; [1992] 1 CTC 264 (FCA), where the court cited Department of Finance
technical notes to support its conclusion that amendments to paragraph 12(1)(b) did not
authorize the taxpayer’s use of a “billed” method of accounting for revenues associated
with telecommunication services provided in the taxpayer’s taxation year.
73 See, for example, R v. Heywood (1994), 120 DLR (4th) 348, at 381 (SCC), per
Cory J, noting that “the political nature of parliamentary debates brings into question the
reliability of the statements made.”
74 Bowman, supra footnote 2, at 1188, observes that these explanatory notes are “in-
tended to inform the public as to the intended meaning and purpose of the legislation,” are
“official statements” issued by the Department of Finance in the name of the minister, and
are generally “non-partisan, and reflect a considered view rather than a polemic.”
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the relevance of these extrinsic materials is best addressed by ruling on
their weight rather than their admissibility.75
With respect to more recent arguments questioning the existence of
coherent statutory purposes, advocates of purposive interpretation have
challenged both the description of the legislative process on which these
arguments are based and the normative implications of this descriptive
theory even where it might accurately depict the process by which legis-
lation is actually enacted. As other legislative process scholars have argued,
predictions of legislative incoherence contradict the relative stability of
legislative outcomes in legislatures such as the US Congress.76 Moreover,
even if these accounts were to present an accurate picture of the legisla-
tive process of the US Congress, it is arguable that they are less applicable
to a parliamentary system such as Canada’s,77 and even less applicable to
the process of tax law reform, much of which occurs within the Depart-
ment of Finance rather than Parliament.
Regardless, as advocates of purposive interpretation have observed,
even if it were true that legislative enactments are the product of unprin-
cipled deals, the conclusion that statutes should be strictly construed does
not necessarily follow from this premise. On the contrary, as US Judge
Richard Posner argues, to the extent that statutes embody legislative com-
promises, purposive interpretation is rendered more complex, but not
displaced:
The “deals” approach can be tucked into the purposive approach by noting
that the relevant purpose is not that of the faction that was pushing the
legislation but that of the enactment itself with any compromises that may
have been built into it.78
Although Canadian courts have not always appreciated this complexity,79
more sophisticated approaches to purposive interpretation take into account
75 For a recent statement to this effect, see The Queen v. Fibreco Export Inc. et al., 95
DTC 5412, at 5414; [1995] 2 CTC 172, at 174 (FCA), per Hugesson JA.
76 See Farber and Frickey, supra footnote 52, at 429-37, who suggest a number of
explanations consistent with public choice theory to explain this relative stability.
77 For a brief discussion of the differences between Canadian and US legislative proc-
esses and the significance of these differences for public choice theories of statutory
interpretation, see Horwitz, supra footnote 52, at 47-50. For one of the few extended
analyses of the Canadian legislative process and its implications for statutory interpreta-
tion, see J.A. Corry, “The Use of Legislative History in the Interpretation of Statutes”
(June-July 1954), 32 The Canadian Bar Review 624-37.
78 Posner, supra footnote 60, at 278.
79 See, for example, Ruth Sullivan’s criticisms of Lor-Wes Contracting, supra footnote
72, in which (as noted, ibid.) the Federal Court of Appeal relied on a federal budget
statement to support its conclusion that the taxpayer was eligible for an investment tax
credit under subsection 127(5). Sullivan comments, supra footnote 11, at 63, “Although
the case may be rightly decided, [the court’s] reasoning is unsatisfactory. It accepts the
extremely broad purpose stated by the Minister, namely, guarding against any slowdown in
investment, while ignoring the evidence that the means adopted by the legislature to
(The footnote is continued on the next page.)
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the multiple and conflicting purposes associated with complex statutes
and legislative compromises.80
Finally, while it might be argued that legislative enactments favouring
well-organized interest groups should be strictly construed in order to
protect the broader public interest,81 it is arguable that other statutory
provisions should be broadly construed to promote public interests other-
wise underrepresented in the legislative process.82 In this respect, as Cass
Sunstein has written, “an interpretive approach that is alert to the risks of
deals and that attempts to make sense of statutory enactments will pro-
duce a superior system of law.”83 Applied to the Income Tax Act, this
approach might favour the strict construction of incentive provisions
favouring well-organized private interests and a more liberal interpreta-
tion of other provisions like anti-avoidance rules aimed at the achievement
of equity among taxpayers.84
Purposive Interpretation and Judicial Discretion
While the preceding analysis defends the concepts of legislative intent
and statutory purpose as legitimate constituents of statutory meaning, it
recognizes that the identification of these intentions and purposes is often
difficult, involving an interpretive exercise all on its own. To the extent
that authoritative statements of legislative intent are often unreliable or
non-existent, while statutory purposes are generally varied and conflicting,
achieve this goal were meant to be limited. The legislature might have extended the
investment [tax] credit to every expenditure on industrial equipment, but it did not do so.
The credit was limited to equipment used for certain industries only. Five or six were
listed in the legislation and neither construction nor road building was mentioned. To
appreciate the purpose of the provision the court must ask not only why the credit was
created but also why it was available for some investments but not others. Until this
second question has been answered, the purpose of the provision is not fully known.”
80 See, for example, Sullivan, ibid., at 47-48.
81 See, for example, Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 486-87, concluding that courts should
“narrowly construe” statutory provisions that “serve no plausible public purpose, and
amount merely to interest-group transfers.”
82 See, for example, Jonathan Macey, “Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model” (March 1986), 86 Columbia Law Review
223-68.
83 Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 450.
84 See, for example, J.E. Fulcher, “The Income Tax Act, the Rules of Interpretation and
Tax Avoidance. Purpose vs. Plain Meaning: Which, When and Why?” (December 1995),
74 The Canadian Bar Review 563-84, at 568, favouring a “liberal interpretation” of provi-
sions aimed at equity among taxpayers and a “jaundiced approach” to the interpretation of
incentive provisions of the Act that are “unrelated to either the raising of revenue or equity
among taxpayers.” For a similar suggestion in the US context, see Deborah A. Geier,
“Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose” (1995), vol. 2, no. 8 Florida Tax
Review 492-519, at 493-503, advocating a purposive approach to the interpretation of
Internal Revenue Code provisions comprising “the fundamental structure underlying the
income tax” and a textualist approach to “statutory language when no structural value is
implicated.”
79 Continued . . .
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and definable at various levels of generality, critics have argued that
purposive interpretation is largely indeterminate, conferring significant
discretion upon unelected judges.85 Indeed, at least one advocate of
purposive interpretation has acknowledged that “[j]udges have consider-
able freedom in formulating their descriptions of legislative purpose.”86
The question of judicial discretion is central to any theory of statutory
interpretation, as it is to other jurisprudential theories. For formalists, this
discretion must be narrowly constrained by the words of the statutory
text, to ensure that courts fulfil their proper role as interpreters of legisla-
tion, rather than legislators in their own right.87 Those favouring more
purposive approaches to statutory interpretation, on the other hand, question
the assumed determinacy of statutory texts,88 emphasize the inescapable
role of the interpreter in statutory interpretation,89 and regard the charac-
terization of legislative intentions and statutory purposes as sufficiently
circumscribed to impose meaningful constraints on judicial interpreters.90
85 See, for example, Easterbrook, supra footnote 46, at 62: “The use of original intent
rather than an objective inquiry into the reasonable import of the language permits a series
of moves. Each move greatly increases the discretion, and therefore the power, of the court
[emphasis in original].”
86 Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 60. See also ibid., at 48, describing the interpretation
of multiple and conflicting purposes as “one of the more discretionary aspects of statutory
interpretation.”
87 See, for example, Robert S. Summers, “Judge Richard Posner’s Jurisprudence” (May
1991), 89 Michigan Law Review 1302-33, at 1320, concluding that “judicial adherence to
the ordinary meaning of ordinary words in the statute restricts the opportunity for strong-
willed judges to substitute their own personal political views for those of the legislature.”
88 See, for example, Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 415-24, criticizing textualist approaches
to statutory interpretation and emphasizing (at 416) that “[s]tatutory terms are not self-
defining, and words have no meaning before or without interpretation.” See also William
N. Eskridge Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, “Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning”
(January 1990), 42 Stanford Law Review 321-84, at 340-45, rejecting textualist approaches
to statutory interpretation on the grounds (among others) that they “oversimplify the meaning
of statutory texts” and “are not so determinate as they sound.” This issue is discussed
further below under the heading “Plain Meaning Rule—Meaning, Interpretation, and the
Plain Meaning Rule.”
89 See, for example, Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra footnote 60, at
58-68, discussing “the critical role of the interpreter’s perspective” in statutory interpreta-
tion. See also Daniel A. Farber, “Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy”
(December 1989), 78 Georgetown Law Journal 281-318; William N. Eskridge Jr., “Spinning
Legislative Supremacy” (December 1989), 78 Georgetown Law Journal 319-52; and Daniel
A. Farber, “The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of
Law” (April 1992), 45 Vanderbilt Law Review 533-59. Many of these insights are based on
contemporary works in philosophical hermeneutics, which is discussed below under the
heading “Plain Meaning Rule—Meaning, Interpretation, and the Plain Meaning Rule.”
90 See, for example, Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 52-54, where she describes as
“norms of plausibility” the background norms or assumptions on which courts necessarily
rely to derive plausible inferences of legislative intentions and statutory purposes. Sullivan
emphasizes (ibid., at 60) the extent to which these assumptions are apt to be shared by
members of an interpretive community, though she acknowledges that disagreements
(The footnote is continued on the next page.)
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Indeed, as elements of statutory meaning together with the statutory text,
it is arguable that purposive considerations impose a further constraint on
statutory interpretation in addition to the words of the statute.91
While the latter arguments justify an important role in statutory inter-
pretation for “the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention
of Parliament,” they do not support the key principle of purposive inter-
pretation that these elements of statutory meaning have priority over the
words of the Act. On the contrary, as critics rightly charge, to the extent
that purposive interpretation downplays the words of the statutory text, it
increases judicial discretion and the possibility of inappropriate judicial
legislation.
In Neuman v. The Queen,92 for example, where the Supreme Court of
Canada considered the anti-avoidance rule in subsection 56(2) of the Act,
the court’s purposive interpretation ignored the final words of the provi-
sion, which require an amount to be included in the taxpayer’s income
“to the extent that it would be if the payment or transfer had been made
to the taxpayer,” and effectively rewrote the text of the Act to exclude
from the scope of this rule the payment of all dividends except those to
which a reassessed taxpayer had a pre-existing entitlement before their
payment to a third party.93 Moreover, as argued in part 1 of this article,
this decision contradicts not only the words of subsection 56(2) but also
the acknowledged purpose of the provision itself “to prevent tax avoid-
ance through income splitting.”94
Purposive Interpretation and Doctrinal Confusion
To the extent that purposive interpretation ignores the words of the statu-
tory text, it not only increases judicial discretion and law making, but
regarding these background norms are a “source of indeterminacy.” For a similar emphasis
on the constraints imposed by the shared understandings of interpretive communities, see
Owen M. Fiss, “Objectivity and Interpretation” (April 1982), 34 Stanford Law Review 739-63.
See also Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 442, concluding that statutory interpretation is
typically “quite predictable, largely because background norms are uncontested among the
judges”; and Posner, supra footnote 60, at 272, commenting that “the existence of shared
values is a partial answer to criticisms that judicial creativity is inherently usurpative.”
91 See, for example, Kernochan, supra footnote 56, at 347-48, arguing that the concepts
of legislative intent and statutory purpose define interpretive guideposts “outside [the
court’s] own subjective judgment,” suggesting “a goal, attainable to a degree,” and de-
manding “an interpretive attitude that acknowledges the role of the legislature.” See also
Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 430, suggesting that “[w]ithout reference to [legislative]
history, interpretation sometimes becomes far less bounded.”
92 Supra footnote 33.
93 See the analysis of the Neuman case in part 1 of this article at footnotes 178 to 193
and accompanying text. For a more detailed analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada
decision in Neuman, see David G. Duff, “Neuman and Beyond: Income-Splitting, Tax
Avoidance, and Statutory Interpretation at the Supreme Court of Canada,” Canadian Business
Law Journal (forthcoming).
94 Neuman, supra footnote 33, at 6301; 187.
90 Continued . . .
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produces questionable judgments and doctrinal confusion, requiring sub-
sequent litigation and/or legislative amendment to clarify the meaning of
the original rule.95 As examples of these results, one need only consider
the Supreme Court of Canada decisions in The Queen v. Bronfman Trust 96
and The Queen v. McClurg.97 While the outcome in each of these cases
may have been justified, the reasons are unsatisfactory and disregard
important aspects of the statutory text. Moreover, in each case, the deci-
sions produced considerable doctrinal confusion followed by subsequent
litigation and/or legislation.
In Bronfman Trust, which involved the interest deductibility provision
in subparagraph 20(1)(c)(i), the court erroneously emphasized the direct
use of borrowed funds rather than the purpose of the use as mandated by
the statutory text, resulting in a confused analysis of two earlier decisions98
and considerable uncertainty about the proper application of the rule.99
Although the Department of Finance released draft legislation responding
to the decision in 1991,100 this legislation is extremely complicated, has
not been enacted into law, and appears to have been abandoned by the
federal government.101 In the meantime, courts continue to grapple with
the requirements of subparagraph 20(1)(c)(i), having yet to fully resolve
the doctrinal confusion created by the decision in Bronfman Trust.102
In McClurg, which involved the anti-avoidance rule in subsection 56(2),
the majority decision ignored the final words of the provision (which, as
noted above, require an amount to be included in the taxpayer’s income
“to the extent that it would be if the payment or transfer had been made
95 See Michael Livingston, “Practical Reason, ‘Purposivism,’ and the Interpretation of
Tax Statutes” (Summer 1996), 51 Tax Law Review 677-724, at 701.
96 Supra footnote 35.
97 Supra footnote 35.
98 Trans-Prairie Pipelines Ltd. v. MNR, 70 DTC 6351; [1970] CTC 537 (Ex. Ct.); and
Zwaig v. MNR, 74 DTC 1121; [1974] CTC 2172 (TRB).
99 See the analysis of this case in part 1 of this article at footnotes 122 to 145 and
accompanying text.
100 Canada, Department of Finance, Draft Legislation: Tax Treatment of Interest Expense,
December 20, 1991. See proposed sections 20.1 and 20.2 and proposed subparagraphs
20(1)(c)(v) and (vi).
101 See Brian J. Arnold and Tim Edgar, “Deductibility of Interest Expense” (1995), vol. 43,
no. 5 Canadian Tax Journal 1216-44, at 1229.
102 For post-Bronfman Trust decisions emphasizing the direct use of borrowed funds,
see The Queen v. Attaie, 90 DTC 6413; [1990] 2 CTC 157 (FCA); Livingston International
Inc. v. The Queen, 92 DTC 6197; [1992] 1 CTC 217 (FCA); Garneau v. The Queen, [1995]
1 CTC 2978 (TCC); 74712 Alberta Limited v. The Queen, [1997] 2 CTC 30 (FCA); and
Singleton v. MNR, [1999] FTR 33201 (FCA). For other cases in which the deduction of
interest on borrowed funds has been allowed on the basis of an eligible indirect use, see
Morscher v. MNR, 92 DTC 2214; [1992] 2 CTC 2534 (TCC); and Grenier v. MNR, 92 DTC
1678; [1992] 1 CTC 2703 (TCC), aff ’d. 98 DTC 6439; [1998] 3 CTC 243 (FCTD). When
this article went to press, the Supreme Court of Canada’s reasons in Shell Canada Limited
had not yet been released.
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to the taxpayer”), affirmed a questionable doctrine excluding most divi-
dends from the scope of the statutory rule, and created considerable
doctrinal uncertainty with its obiter statement suggesting that the provi-
sion might nonetheless apply to the payment of a discretionary dividend
when a “non-arm’s length shareholder has made no contribution to the
company.”103 While the court’s subsequent decision in Neuman appears to
have resolved this uncertainty by rejecting the obiter statement and reaf-
firming the general rule that subsection 56(2) cannot apply to the payment
of a dividend, as stated above,104 this conclusion contradicts both the text
of the provision and its acknowledged purpose “to prevent tax avoidance
through income splitting.” Although the decision may forestall future liti-
gation,105 it has already provoked a legislative response. In the February
1999 budget, the federal government proposed to introduce a special “income-
splitting tax,” applying the top marginal rate of tax to taxable dividends
(as well as certain other amounts) received by a minor child.106 According
to the budget, this measure was necessary because “recent case law [that
is, Neuman] has provided support for income-splitting techniques con-
trary to policy intent.”107 In addition, the budget explained:
The scope of this new measure is narrow; it targets those structures that are
primarily put in place to facilitate income splitting with minors. The gov-
ernment will monitor the effectiveness of this targeted measure, and may
take appropriate action if new income-splitting techniques develop.108
Therefore, even this new measure may not be the last word on the subject.
Purposive Interpretation and the Rule of Law
For the purposes of this article, the rule of law can be characterized by
five basic criteria of a legal system:109
1) knowability, according to which laws are publicly available and
prospective in effect;
103 McClurg, supra footnote 35, at 5013; 185. See the analysis of this case in part 1 of
this article at footnotes 146 to 177 and accompanying text.
104 See supra footnotes 93 and 94 and accompanying text.
105 Even this result may be uncertain, to the extent that Iacobucci J’s decision in Neuman
is qualified by the assumption (supra footnote 33, at 6304; 193) that “proper consideration
was given for the shares when issued.” To the extent that “proper consideration” is diffi-
cult to determine for shares on which discretionary dividends might subsequently be paid,
this qualification might well be tested through subsequent litigation.
106 Canada, Department of Finance, 1999 Budget, annex 7, February 16, 1999, 193-94
and 238-39.
107 Ibid., at 193.
108 Ibid., at 194.
109 These criteria are derived from Lawrence B. Solum, “Equity and the Rule of Law,”
in Ian Shapiro, ed., The Rule of Law (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 120-47,
at 121-23. For useful discussions of the rule of law, see also Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law
and Its Virtue” (April 1977), 93 Law Quarterly Review 195-211; and Margaret Jane Radin,
“Reconsidering the Rule of Law” (July 1989), 69 Boston University Law Review 781-819.
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2) generality, demanding that statutes and other legal rules are of gen-
eral application, not aimed at particular individuals;
3) regularity, by which similar cases are to be treated similarly;
4) performability, demanding that laws be such that persons may rea-
sonably be capable of fulfilling their commands; and
5) fair and orderly procedures for the determination of specific cases.
The rule of law also underlies the various procedural requirements that a
legislature must satisfy to translate its intentions and purposes into authori-
tative legal form.110
On this basis, one can readily see why critics might object to a purposive
approach to statutory interpretation. To the extent that purposive interpre-
tation considers elements extrinsic to the words of the statutory text, it is
argued, this approach contradicts the principles of knowability and
performability according to which citizens should be able to determine
the legal rules to which they are subject. As Peter Hogg and Joanne
Magee suggest,
[i]t would introduce intolerable uncertainty into the Income Tax Act if clear
language in a detailed provision of the Act were to be qualified by unex-
pressed exceptions derived from a court’s view of the object and purpose
of the provision.111
Indeed, it is on this basis that English and Canadian courts traditionally
excluded legislative history as an admissible aid to statutory interpretation.112
In addition, critics argue, by regarding legislative intentions and statu-
tory purposes, rather than statutory texts, as the essential elements of
statutory meaning, purposive interpretation ignores fundamental legal prin-
ciples according to which statutory law comprises only duly authorized
legislative enactments, not underlying intentions and purposes that have
not satisfied the procedural steps necessary to the enactment of valid
statutory provisions. In this respect, as Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote,
courts should “not inquire what the legislature meant” but “only what the
110 For a brief summary of the legislative processes by which tax legislation is enacted,
see Vern Krishna, The Fundamentals of Canadian Income Tax, 5th ed. (Scarborough, Ont.:
Carswell, 1995), 10-11.
111 Peter W. Hogg and Joanne E. Magee, Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law, 2d
ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1997), 476. See also Karen Sharlow, “The Interpretation
of Tax Legislation and the Rule of Law—Rejoinder” (March 1996), 75 The Canadian Bar
Review 151-54, at 152, commenting that the use of statutory purpose “to distort the meaning
of the words used in the Income Tax Act . . . undermines the rule of law, ultimately jeop-
ardizing the integrity of the tax system.”
112 See, for example, Pepper v. Hart, supra footnote 68, at 52, in which Lord Oliver of
Aylmerton cautioned against the use of interpretive aids that are not “readily or ordinarily
accessible to the citizen whose rights and duties are to be affected.”
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statute means.”113 Similarly, US Judge Frank Easterbrook emphasizes that “[t]he
words of the statute, and not the intent of the drafters, are the ‘law.’ ”114
While the rule of law is an important value in a free and democratic
society, it must be balanced against other values such as fairness and
efficiency. Where persons engage in schemes that are deliberately de-
signed to adhere to the letter of a statute while violating its spirit, the
values of certainty and predictability rightly yield to principles of fair-
ness.115 In the application of the Income Tax Act, such a balance underlies
judicial anti-avoidance doctrines such as the “object and spirit” test set
out in Stubart ;116 specific anti-avoidance rules such as section 68, which
applies where an amount “can reasonably be regarded” as something other
than its true legal character;117 the “artificial transactions” rule in former
subsection 245(1); and the general anti-avoidance rule in section 245.
Likewise, where legislation contains drafting errors or leads to absurd
consequences, it is well established that courts may disregard the actual
words of the statute to achieve a fair and reasonable result consistent with
legislative intentions and statutory purposes.118 In at least one Canadian
income tax case, for example, the Tax Review Board allowed a taxpayer’s
deduction for capital cost allowance on the basis that the words “corru-
gated iron,” which does not exist, should be read, as they now do, as
“corrugated metal.”119
Subject to these qualifications, methods of statutory interpretation that
disregard the words of the statutory text are rightly criticized on the basis
that they offend the rule of law. To the extent that purposive interpretation
downplays the textual elements of statutory interpretation, therefore, both
of the arguments considered above are valid. In fact, as illustrated by the
Supreme Court of Canada decision in Neuman, purposive interpretation
can produce decisions strikingly at odds with the words of the statute.120
113 Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Theory of Legal Interpretation” (January 25, 1899),
12 Harvard Law Review 417-20, at 419.
114 Easterbrook, supra footnote 46, at 60. Radin, supra footnote 49, at 871, emphasizes
that “in law, the specific individuals who make up the legislature are men to whom a
specialized function has been temporarily assigned. That function is not to impose their
will even within limits on their fellow-citizens, but to ‘pass statutes,’ which is a fairly
precise operation.” Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 416, observes, “Statutory terms are the
enactment of the democratically elected legislature and represent the relevant ‘law.’ Statu-
tory terms—not legislative history, not legislative purpose, not legislative ‘intent’—have
gone through the constitutionally specified procedures for the enactment of law.”
115 See the discussion of avoidance schemes in Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 114-22
and 413-15.
116 See supra footnote 34.
117 For other anti-avoidance rules employing similar language, see subsections 6(3) and 16(1).
118 See Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 79-99 and 104-10.
119 Triple “F” Holdings Ltd. v. MNR, 81 DTC 135; [1981] CTC 2084 (TRB). This case
is discussed in part 1 of this article at footnotes 77 to 79 and accompanying text.
120 See supra footnotes 93 and 94 and accompanying text.
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Nonetheless, although these arguments challenge the primary tenet of
purposive interpretation that “the scheme of the Act, the object of the
Act, and the intention of Parliament” are the primary considerations in
statutory interpretation, they do not rule out judicial attention to these
purposive considerations in interpreting the meaning of statutory provi-
sions. On the contrary, where courts draw inferences regarding legislative
intentions and statutory purposes from authoritative statutory texts, these
inferences offend the rule of law no more than any other method of
statutory interpretation. Likewise, to the extent that courts refer to extrin-
sic aids, such as the legislative history of a statute or amendment, in
order to interpret (and not supplant) statutory texts, the rule of law is also
unimpaired. Indeed, much legislative history—for example, budget state-
ments and Department of Finance technical notes—is as readily accessible
as prior judicial decisions whose interpretive relevance is unquestioned.
PLAIN MEANING RULE
In response to the various concerns about purposive interpretation outlined
in the previous section, courts and commentators have placed increasing
emphasis on the primacy of the statutory text.121 In several recent cases,
for example, the Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed a “plain meaning
rule” according to which “clear words” of a statutory provision should be
applied regardless of “the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and
the intention of Parliament,” which may be considered only to resolve
some pre-existing doubt or ambiguity, not to create it.122
Since this emphasis on a “plain meaning” approach is best understood
as a reaction to the deficiencies of purposive interpretation, it is not
surprising that the primary arguments in its favour correspond to those
against the purposive approach. Thus, advocates contend, by interpreting
statutes literally, without regard to legislative intentions and statutory
purposes except where statutory texts are ambiguous on their face, a plain
121 For example, Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 415-16, observes, “Textualism appears
to be enjoying a renaissance in a number of recent cases, and perhaps in the academy as
well, partly because of dissatisfaction with alternative interpretive strategies . . . which
counsel courts to rely on ‘purpose’ or to produce ‘reason’ in regulatory regimes.” For an
early appreciation of the shift to textualist interpretation in the US Supreme Court, see
Note, “Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the
Supreme Court” (February 1982), 95 Harvard Law Review 892-915. For other analyses of
this development in the United States, see William N. Eskridge Jr., “The New Textualism”
(April 1990), 37 UCLA Law Review 621-91; Nicholas S. Zeppos, “Justice Scalia’s Textu-
alism: The ‘New’ New Legal Process” (June 1991), 12 Cardozo Law Review 1597-1643;
and George H. Taylor, “Structural Textualism” (March 1995), 75 Boston University Law
Review 321-85. For a leading statement of the textualist approach to statutory interpreta-
tion by its most prominent advocate on the US Supreme Court, see Antonin Scalia, A
Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1997).
122 See, for example, R v. McIntosh, [1995] 1 SCR 686; Antosko, supra footnote 34; and
Friesen v. The Queen, 95 DTC 5551; [1995] 2 CTC 369 (SCC). These cases are examined
in part 1 of this article at footnotes 199 to 268 and accompanying text.
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meaning rule limits judicial discretion123 and advances the values of cer-
tainty and predictability associated with the rule of law.124 In addition, it
is suggested, to the extent that the legislature has expressed itself in clear
and unambiguous statutory language, a plain meaning rule respects the
principle of legislative supremacy by giving full effect to this language
regardless of its consequences. This reasoning is reflected in the words of
Lamer CJ in R v. Multiform Mfg.:
When the courts are called upon to interpret a statute, their task is to
discover the intention of Parliament. When the words used in a statute are
clear and unambiguous, no further step is needed to identify the intention
of Parliament. There is no need for further construction when Parliament
has clearly expressed its intention in the words it has used in the statute.125
Finally, it is argued, such an approach facilitates economical decision
making by inexpert judges126 and creates incentives for legislatures to
draft statutes in clear and precise language that may be easily understood
by citizens and the courts.127
To critics, however, the plain meaning rule oversimplifies the meaning
of statutory texts, creates a questionable and malleable distinction between
“ambiguous” and “unambiguous” statutory language, and mischaracter-
izes the respective institutional responsibilities and capacities of courts
and legislatures. As a result, it is argued, the plain meaning rule obscures
the process of statutory interpretation, artificially limits its scope, pro-
duces decisions contrary to legislative intentions and statutory purposes,
permits substantial judicial discretion, and places an unreasonable burden
on legislative drafters.
This section considers each of these arguments, accepting all as persua-
sive criticisms of the plain meaning approach affirmed in recent Supreme
Court of Canada decisions. While the emphasis of this interpretive approach
123 See, for example, Summers, supra footnote 87, at 1320; and Easterbrook, “Text,
History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,” supra footnote 65, at 63.
124 See, for example, Hogg and Magee, supra footnote 111, at 475-76; and Sharlow,
supra footnote 111. For similar arguments in favour of a plain meaning approach in the
United States, see Antonin Scalia, “The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules” (Fall 1989), 56
University of Chicago Law Review 1175-88.
125 (1990), 79 CR (3d) 390, at 394 (SCC). For an earlier statement of this view, see the
Sussex Peerage Case (1844), 8 ER 1034, at 1057 (HL), per Tindal CJ: “My Lords, the only
rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that they should be construed according
to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in
themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound
those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such
case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver.”
126 See, for example, Frederick Schauer, “Statutory Construction and the Coordinating
Function of Plain Meaning” [1990] The Supreme Court Review 231-56; and Easterbrook,
“Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,” supra footnote 65, at 69.
127 For example, Shepsle, supra footnote 49, at 253, suggests that “a potential benefit
of a rather rigorous application of plain meaning” is that “rational legislators with a
modicum of foresight will seek to make their statutes plainer and more meaningful.”
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on the words of the statutory text is a salutary response to the defects of
purposive interpretation, the plain meaning rule goes too far by ignoring
the role that purposive and contextual considerations should and neces-
sarily do play in the interpretation of statutory words.
Meaning, Interpretation, and the Plain Meaning Rule
Textual analysis is a subject of many fields of academic inquiry, the most
relevant of which for statutory interpretation are the philosophy of lan-
guage,128 literary theory,129 and philosophical hermeneutics (the study of
interpretation).130 From these disciplines, critics of the plain meaning rule
have drawn three crucial insights about the meaning of texts in general
and statutory texts in particular.
First, words do not have fixed and certain meanings but derive their
meanings from linguistic conventions and cultural norms, as well as the
specific contexts in which they are used.131 As US Judge Learned Hand
observed,
[w]ords are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal
existence; and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other,
but all in their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which they
are used.132
128 See, for example, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2d ed., trans.
G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958); John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay on
the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1969); and
Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning
in Language, trans. Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1977). See also “Interpretation Symposium: Philosophy of
Language and Legal Interpretation” (1985), 58 Southern California Law Review 277-549.
129 See, for example, Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of
Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); “Sympo-
sium on Law and Literature” (March 1982), 60 Texas Law Review 373-586; and Stanley
Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in
Literary and Legal Studies (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989).
130 See, for example, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2d rev. ed. (New York:
Crossroad, 1989); and Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (Cambridge,
Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1981). For useful introductions to this literature and its
relevance to statutory interpretation, see “Interpretation Symposium: Hermeneutics and
Legal Interpretation” (1985), 58 Southern California Law Review 35-275; Francis J. Mootz
III, “The Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on
the Work of Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur” (May 1988), 68 Boston University Law
Review 523-617; William Eskridge Jr., “Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation” (April 1990),
90 Columbia Law Review 609-81; and “A Symposium on Legal and Political Hermeneutics”
(1995), 16 Cardozo Law Review 1879-2351.
131 See, for example, Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 416, observing that “the meaning of
words (whether ‘plain’ or not) depends on both culture and context [emphasis in original].”
132 National Labor Relations Board v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, at 957 (2d Cir.
1941). See also Towne v. Eisner, 245 US 418, at 425 (1918), per Holmes J, observing that
“[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may
vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it
is used”; and British Columbia Telephone Company v. The Queen, 92 DTC 6129, at 6132;
(The footnote is continued on the next page.)
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As a result, while the meaning of a statutory provision depends partly on
the internal structure of the provision and its relationship to the statute as
a whole (the “internal context” of the statutory text),133 it also depends on
external assumptions regarding the conventional use of a shared language,
the purpose and subject-matter of the text, and the legal and cultural
norms of the society in which the statute is enacted and operates (the
“external context” of the statutory text).134
Second, the meaning of a text does not exist independently of interpre-
tation but is the result of interpretation.135 Words, as Sunstein explains,
“are not self-defining,” and texts “do not have pre-interpretive mean-
ings.”136 On the contrary, as Hans-Georg Gadamer has written,
[i]nterpretation is not an occasional, post facto supplement to understand-
ing; rather, understanding is always interpretation, and hence interpretation
is the explicit form of understanding.137
As a result, although specific contexts and shared background assump-
tions may suggest a single plausible meaning for a statutory text,138 this
[1992] 1 CTC 26, at 30 (FCA), per MacGuigan JA, emphasizing that “words can never be
considered apart from their context, since context imparts meaning to that which it surrounds.”
133 For example, William D. Popkin, “The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation”
(March 1988), 61 Southern California Law Review 541-627, at 593, describes the “internal
context” of the statute as “the statute’s language surrounding the words being interpreted.”
For a useful discussion of this internal context, see Taylor, supra footnote 121, at 359-62.
For a detailed summary of the various interpretive principles governing the use of this
internal context in statutory interpretation, see Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 155-92, 197-213,
and 245-84. The role of this internal context in statutory interpretation is examined more
fully below under the heading “Words-in-Total-Context Approach—Internal Context.”
134 See, for example, Popkin, supra footnote 133, at 593, describing the “external con-
text” of the statute as “information about the world outside the statute that sheds light on
the text’s meaning. It includes the common understanding of the language that the writer
and reader are likely to share, the purposes of the text, and the surrounding background of
values in which the text is adopted.” See also Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 411, emphasiz-
ing that “[t]he meaning of a statute inevitably depends on the precepts with which
interpreters approach its text” and adding that “[t]hese principles are usually not ‘in’ any
authoritative enactment but instead are drawn from the particular context and, more gener-
ally, from the legal culture”; and Posner, supra footnote 60, at 296, suggesting that “meaning
does not reside simply in the words of a text, for the words are always pointing to some-
thing outside. Meaning is that which emerges when linguistic and cultural understandings
and experiences are brought to bear on the text.” For a useful discussion of this external
context, see Taylor, supra footnote 121, at 362-83. See also Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at
285-425. The role of external context in statutory interpretation is examined more fully
below under the heading “Words-in-Total-Context Approach—External Context.”
135 See, for example, Eskridge and Frickey, supra footnote 88, at 346: “Hermeneutics
suggests that the text lacks meaning until it is interpreted [emphasis in original].”
136 Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 416 and 411.
137 Gadamer, supra footnote 130, at 307.
138 See, for example, Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 9: “In so far as the readers of a
legislative text belong to the same linguistic community and share the same conventions,
the meaning they attribute to the text is likely to be ‘common’ or ‘ordinary’ in the sense of
being more or less ‘the same for all.’ ”
132 Continued . . .
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meaning, as Stanley Fish explains, is not pre-interpretive but “a product
of perspective” and “itself an interpretation.”139 Moreover, in other circum-
stances, changed contexts or cultural diversity may support more than
one plausible meaning.140 Indeed, as US Judge Richard Posner observes,
“[t]he diversity of modern legal culture makes it inevitable that there will
be a large area of interpretive indeterminacy.”141
Third, to truly understand a text, an interpreter must neither impose a
preconceived meaning upon the text nor attempt to disregard the precon-
ceptions that he or she inevitably brings to the text, but must engage with
the text in order to examine and, where necessary, revise these presuppo-
sitions. Describing this “back and forth” process of textual analysis as a
“hermeneutic circle,” Gadamer explains:
A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects
a meaning for the text as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text.
Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the text with
particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. Working out this
fore-projection which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he
penetrates into the meaning, is understanding what is there.142
Thus, he continues:
A person trying to understand something will not resign himself from the
start to relying on his own accidental fore-meanings, ignoring as consist-
ently and stubbornly as possible the actual meaning of the text until the
latter becomes so persistently audible that it breaks through what the inter-
preter imagines it to be. Rather, a person trying to understand a text is
prepared for it to tell him something.143
In this respect, as William Eskridge Jr. observes, successful interpretation
can be likened to a conversation or dialogue, in which meaning emerges
from a “to-and-fro movement of genuine interaction” between the inter-
preter and the text.144 Likewise, he suggests, the most exemplary method
of statutory interpretation is similarly conversational or “dialogical”:
“multidimensional,” not confined, “open rather than dogmatic, critical
rather than docile, inquiring rather than accepting.”145
Returning to the plain meaning rule, these insights on the meaning of
texts and the nature of interpretation suggest three specific criticisms.
First, the assertion that the meaning of a statutory text is “clear and
plain” is properly understood not as a conclusion rendering interpretation
139 Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, supra footnote 129, at 185.
140 See the analysis of these issues below under the heading “Words-in-Total-Context
Approach—Changed Contexts.”
141 Posner, supra footnote 60, at 296.
142 Gadamer, supra footnote 130, at 267.
143 Ibid., at 269.
144 Eskridge, supra footnote 130, at 623-24.
145 Ibid., at 633.
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unnecessary but as a judgment resulting from an interpretative process in
its own right. As one critic observes,
when courts say that a statute is plain and therefore needs no interpretation,
they do so in an inverted fashion which marks so much of the judicial
process. They have already interpreted, and they then declare that so inter-
preted the statute needs no further interpretation.146
As a result, the suggestion in one recent Supreme Court of Canada deci-
sion that “the task of interpretation does not arise” whenever “the language
of the statute is plain and admits of only one meaning”147 is surely mis-
taken. On the contrary, the very conclusion that “the language of the
statute is plain and admits of only one meaning” is, in the words of
Stanley Fish, “a product of perspective” and “itself an interpretation.”148
Second, while shared norms and contextual understandings may sug-
gest a single plausible meaning that can be characterized as “clear or
plain,”149 differing background assumptions may support more than one
plausible meaning.150 Indeed, disagreements about the meaning of a text
frequently turn on differences in the background assumptions through
which the text is understood.151 In these circumstances, references to the
“plain meaning” of the text not only are incomplete, but conceal, if only
inadvertently, the background assumptions underlying the conclusion that
the meaning of the text is in fact clear and plain. In Antosko et al. v. The
Queen,152 for example, the Supreme Court of Canada’s conclusion that the
transaction at issue fell within the “clear and plain” meaning of subsec-
tion 20(14) of the Act reflects an underlying assumption that taxpayers
are entitled to the benefit of statutory provisions irrespective of their
object and spirit, provided that the transaction at issue is neither a sham,
nor artificial, nor blatantly synthetic.153 While this assumption has a lengthy
146 Radin, supra footnote 49, at 869. See also Dworkin, supra footnote 60, at 352,
explaining that the conclusion that a statute is unclear “is the result rather than the occasion”
of statutory interpretation (emphasis in original).
147 McIntosh, supra footnote 122, at 697, per Lamer CJ. See the discussion of this case
in part 1 of this article at footnotes 199 to 203 and accompanying text.
148 Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, supra footnote 129, at 185.
149 See Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 423: “In easy cases, interpretive norms—on which
there is wide or universal consensus—and context both play a part in the process of ascertain-
ing statutory meaning. Because such norms are so widely shared, they are invisible and are
not an object of controversy. Only in these cases can meaning ever be said to be ‘plain.’ ”
150 See, for example, Willis, supra footnote 2, at 2, noting that “it is quite possible for
all the members of a court to agree that the meaning of a section is so plain that it cannot
be controlled by the context and yet disagree as to what that plain meaning is.”
151 See Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 418: “In many hard cases . . . the source of the
difficulty is that the particular background norm and the nature of its application will be
highly controversial.”
152 Supra footnote 34.
153 See the analysis of the Antosko case in part 1 of this article at footnotes 208 to 229
and accompanying text.
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history in Anglo-Canadian income tax law,154 it is not inevitable155 and
has been legislatively overruled in Canada by the enactment of the gen-
eral anti-avoidance rule.
Third, by disregarding indications of statutory meaning other than the
text alone, the plain meaning rule imposes artificial limits on the inter-
pretive process.156 In many cases, the meaning of a statutory text may
seem clear and plain on the basis of an acontextual reading but ambigu-
ous when read in light of “the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act,
and the intention of Parliament.” In Friesen v. The Queen,157 for example,
the majority’s “plain reading” of subsection 10(1) of the Act (as it then
read) is rendered ambiguous through the minority’s contextual analysis of
the purpose of inventory accounting and the relationship between subsec-
tion 10(1) and section 9.158 Likewise in Golden, the minority’s plain reading
of the words “something else” in section 68 of the Act (as it then read)
becomes ambiguous in light of the majority’s contextual analysis.159 To
the extent that the plain meaning rule ignores these purposive and contex-
tual considerations, judges who rely on it are apt to misinterpret statutory
provisions,160 producing questionable results at odds with legislative inten-
tions and statutory purposes,161 and increasing uncertainty in the application
of the law.162
154 See, for example, Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Westminster (Duke), [1936] AC
1 (HL).
155 The US Supreme Court, for example, adopted a markedly different approach, af-
firming a “business purpose test” in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 US 465 (1935).
156 Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation (Concord, Ont.: Irwin Law, 1997), 50. See
also Posner, supra footnote 60, at 264, commenting that the plain meaning approach “arti-
ficially truncates the interpretive process.”
157 Supra footnote 122.
158 See the analysis of the Friesen case in part 1 of this article at footnotes 230 to 268
and accompanying text.
159 See the discussion of the Golden case in part 1 of this article at footnotes 291 to
316 and accompanying text.
160 See, for example, Mary L. Heen, “Plain Meaning, the Tax Code, and Doctrinal
Incoherence” (April 1997), 48 Hastings Law Journal 771-820, at 812: “An increased
emphasis on ‘plain meaning’ analysis of the Code poses an increased risk of misinterpre-
tation in tax cases.”
161 See, for example, Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 424: “An interpretive strategy that
relies exclusively on the ordinary meaning of words . . . will sometimes produce irration-
ality or injustice that the legislature did not intend.” See also Brian J. Arnold, “Statutory
Interpretation: Some Thoughts on Plain Meaning,” in Report of Proceedings of the Fiftieth
Tax Conference, 1998 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1999), 6:1-36,
at 6:23, suggesting that the plain meaning rule “leads to unfair, arbitrary, ridiculous results.”
162 See, for example, Kerry Harnish, “Interpreting the Income Tax Act: Purpose v. Plain
Meaning and the Effect of Uncertainty in the Tax Law” (1997), vol. 35, no. 3 Alberta Law
Review 687-725, at 696, arguing that the plain meaning rule “introduces an unwarranted
level of subjectivity into the interpretive process that can only heighten the overall uncer-
tainty in society as to the application of particular tax laws [emphasis in original].”
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Finally, although judges who invoke the plain meaning rule typically
consider other indications of statutory meaning in order to confirm their
initial reading of the text, these analyses are generally unconvincing,
reflecting not a “genuine interaction” between the interpreter and the text,
but a questionable imputation of assumed purposes designed to support
the “plain reading” at which the judge has already arrived. In Friesen, for
example, the majority’s analysis of the purpose of the lower of cost and
market rule in subsection 10(1) of the Act (as it then read) ignores the
implication of its traditional limitation to ordinary trading businesses that
it was a limited exception to the realization and matching principles,
which did not extend to adventures in the nature of trade.163 Likewise in
Golden, the minority’s argument that the purpose of section 68 (as it then
read) was “to allow the Minister to deem an allocation between the pro-
ceeds of disposition of property and sums received by the taxpayer in
return for something other than property”164 seems implausible in light of
the majority’s analysis of “the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act,
and the intention of Parliament.”165 Consequently, while it is true, as Ruth
Sullivan observes, that the plain meaning rule has a pronounced rhetorical
character and is often invoked by courts “less to constrain their own inter-
pretive practice” than to “discount the weight of the arguments that favour
alternative interpretations,”166 it is also true that judicial references to this
doctrine influence the process of interpretation, attaching much more weight to
initial acontextual readings of the statutory text than to other elements of
statutory meaning. Indeed, as the majority decision in Friesen and the minor-
ity decision in Golden suggest, even rhetorical uses of the plain meaning rule
may, by discouraging a genuine process of open, critical, and inquiring
interpretation, cause judges to misinterpret statutory provisions and arrive
at conclusions contrary to legislative intentions and statutory purposes.
Ambiguity
In addition to these objections, the plain meaning rule can be criticized
for the artificial emphasis that it places on a preliminary finding of textual
ambiguity. To begin with, since the conclusion that the meaning of a
statutory text is plain or ambiguous itself depends on cultural norms and
contextual understandings that are external to the text, it is odd to make a
finding of textual ambiguity the test by which these external understandings
may be explicitly considered in the process of statutory interpretation.167
163 See part 1 of this article at footnotes 230 to 268 and accompanying text.
164 Supra footnote 39, at 6143; 282.
165 See part 1 of this article at footnotes 291 to 316 and accompanying text.
166 Sullivan, supra footnote 156, at 51. See also Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 5-6,
discussing the rhetorical use of the plain meaning rule.
167 See, for example, Paul Mitchell, “Just Do It! Eskridge’s Critical Pragmatic Theory
of Statutory Interpretation” (1996), 41 McGill Law Journal 713-38, at 719-20, observing
that “the declaration that a statute is ‘ambiguous’ cannot be separated from the interpreter’s
substantive views.”
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More generally, since the standard by which ambiguity is determined
is itself unclear and based on unarticulated background assumptions, courts
may effectively consider contextual and purposive factors whenever they
so choose simply by expressing some doubt as to the “plain meaning” of
the text.168 Indeed, as Cory J observed in The Queen v. Province of Alberta
Treasury Branches et al., “agile legal minds could probably find an ambi-
guity in as simple a request as ‘close the door please’ and most certainly
in even the shortest and clearest of the ten commandments.”169 As a result,
the plain meaning rule not only fails to limit judicial discretion, but actu-
ally increases judicial discretion by making such a crucial stage in the
interpretive process depend on a vague standard.170 In any event, as Brian
Arnold observes, “counsel must be prepared to make arguments concern-
ing legislative purpose” in every case, “in case the court finds that there
is some doubt or ambiguity in the statutory language.”171
Finally, since legal disputes often arise where the meaning of a statute
is subject to different plausible interpretations, a measure of textual am-
biguity is often apparent in litigated tax cases, particularly those appealed
to higher level courts.172 In Alberta Treasury Branches, for example, Cory J
observed that
the very history of this case with the clear differences of opinion expressed
as between the trial judges and the Court of Appeal of Alberta indicates
that for able and experienced legal minds, neither the meaning of the legis-
lation nor its application to the facts is clear. It would therefore seem to be
appropriate to consider the object and purpose of the legislation.173
As a result, even if were possible to determine the plain meaning of the
text without regard to cultural norms and contextual understandings, the
concept of a “plain meaning” would have a small role to play in actual
tax cases.
Institutional Competence
Notwithstanding these criticisms, one might nonetheless defend the plain
meaning rule on the grounds that it facilitates economical decision making
by inexpert judges and encourages the legislature to draft statutes in a
clear and precise manner that may be readily understood by courts and
168 See Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 3; and Arnold, supra footnote 161, at 6:25.
169 96 DTC 6245, at 6248; [1996] 1 CTC 395, at 403 (SCC). On potential ambiguity in
the expression “close the door please,” see Arnold, supra footnote 161, at 6:25, footnote
78, where he interprets the phrase as a response to the statement “I’m leaving you.”
Although the words might, as Arnold suggests, have a sarcastic meaning along the lines of
“What’s stopping you?” or “I don’t care,” they might also suggest an effort at reconcilia-
tion, with the speaker requesting the other person to remain in the room to sort things out.
170 Arnold, supra footnote 161, at 6:25.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
173 Supra footnote 169, at 6248; 403.
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citizens. Moreover, as the Supreme Court of Canada suggested in Morguard
Properties Ltd. v. City of Winnipeg,174 the legislature may always amend a
statute to reverse a judicial decision with which it disagrees.175
The last of these arguments was addressed in the earlier evaluation of
strict construction, where it was noted that subsequent amendments in-
crease the length and complexity of legislative enactments and fail to
discourage continued efforts at tax avoidance.176 To the extent that literal
interpretations disregarding legislative intentions and statutory purposes
are reversed by legislative amendment, the same criticisms may be directed
at the plain meaning rule. Moreover, as critics have noted, although judi-
cial decisions may be reversed by amendment, this process is both costly
and time-consuming.177 As a result, as Arnold concludes, it makes more
sense for courts to “work with the legislature to keep legislation workable
and up-to-date and to avoid making it necessary for the legislature to
continually fix inappropriate court decisions.”178
As for the argument that a plain meaning approach is likely to encourage
clear and precise statutory drafting, the legacy of strict construction sug-
gests otherwise: that legislatures will enact detailed and ponderous statutory
provisions designed to ensure that specific amounts and transactions are
brought within “the letter of the law.” Indeed, as one critic has observed,
the plain meaning approach “frustrates the drafter’s task by establishing
an abnormal, noncooperative communication relationship between the
drafter and the court.”179 More generally, since it is impossible to foresee
all potential ambiguities in the application of a statute as pervasive and
detailed as the Income Tax Act, it is unreasonable to expect the legisla-
ture to draft clear and precise language to address every eventuality.180 On
the contrary, as critics of the plain meaning rule suggest, in the application
of statutory provisions to concrete facts, comparative institutional compe-
tence rests with the courts, not the legislature.181 As Sunstein observes,
the focus on the particular circumstances enables judges to deal with appli-
cations that no legislature, no matter how farsighted, could conceivably
have foreseen. Under changed or unforeseen circumstances, mechanical
application of statutory terms is unlikely to produce sound results, even
174 Supra footnote 10. See also Lamer CJ’s decision in McIntosh, supra footnote 122.
175 See supra footnote 13 and accompanying text.
176 See footnotes 27 to 31 and accompanying text.
177 See, for example, Farber and Frickey, supra footnote 52, at 458; and Heen, supra
footnote 160, at 815.
178 Arnold, supra footnote 161, at 6:12.
179 Farber, “The Inevitability of Practical Reason,” supra footnote 89, at 551.
180 See, for example, Eskridge, supra footnote 121, at 677, questioning whether textu-
alist approaches to statutory interpretation are likely to “have much, if any, effect on the
way Congress drafts statutes.”
181 See, for example, Neil Brooks, “The Responsibility of Judges in Interpreting Tax
Legislation,” in Graeme S. Cooper, ed., Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law (Amsterdam:
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 1997), 93-129, at 104-6.
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from the standpoint of the enacting legislature. By contrast, judicial resolu-
tion of individual cases, allowing an emphasis on particular settings with
which a lawmaker could not be familiar, contains significant advantages
for interpretation.182
Finally, this relative institutional competence of courts over legisla-
tures provides a response to the first argument that the plain meaning rule
facilitates economical decision making by inexpert judges. Although this
approach may indeed facilitate a more economical process of judicial
reasoning, it does so only by disregarding the unique judicial responsibil-
ity to interpret statutory provisions in the context of particular cases.183
Moreover, to the extent that inexpert judges are considered a barrier to
effective judicial decision making in the field of tax law, the appropriate
remedy lies not in an interpretive doctrine designed to mask this defi-
ciency, but in effective advocacy by knowledgeable counsel and expert
tribunals like the Tax Court of Canada.184
WORDS-IN-TOTAL-CONTEXT APPROACH
Although the Supreme Court of Canada has, in the years since its decision
in Stubart, espoused both purposive interpretation and the plain meaning
rule, the words-in-total-context approach is arguably most consistent with
the dicta in Stubart185 and most compatible with the actual content of
recent Supreme Court decisions, which, as the cases examined in part 1
illustrate, tend to examine both the text of the statute and its purpose,
regardless of the interpretive doctrine that the decision purports to apply.186
Moreover, in Alberta Treasury Branches, a majority of the court appears
to have favoured this approach, concluding that “in order to determine
the clear and plain meaning of the statute it is always appropriate to
consider the ‘scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention
of Parliament.’ ”187
182 Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 439.
183 See, for example, Robert Thornton Smith, “Interpreting the Internal Revenue Code:
A Tax Jurisprudence” (September 1994), 72 Taxes: The Tax Magazine 527-58, at 553,
concluding that “[c]ourts have front-line responsibility for application in tax matters.”
184 See, for example, Arnold, supra footnote 161, at 6:36, considering “the possibility
of creating a final tax court of appeal composed of judges who have tax expertise and
restricting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear tax cases.”
185 Arnold, ibid., at 6:21, argues that the words-in-total-context approach was “adopted
by the Supreme Court in Stubart before the confusion over plain meaning in the Antosko
and Friesen cases.”
186 This is not to suggest that the choice of interpretive doctrine has no influence on the
manner in which the case is decided. On the contrary, as the evaluations of purposive
interpretation and the plain meaning rule suggest, purposive interpretation tends to downplay
the importance of the text while the plain meaning rule tends to downplay the role of
contextual and purposive considerations.
187 Supra footnote 169, at 6248; 403-4, per Cory J. Significantly, although Iacobucci J
joined Major J’s dissent, he concurred in Cory J’s approach to statutory interpretation.
(The footnote is continued on the next page.)
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Insofar as the words-in-total-context approach represents a synthesis
of the plain meaning rule and purposive interpretation, the arguments in
favour of the former approach build upon those against each of these
doctrinal alternatives. Unlike purposive interpretation, which is insuffi-
ciently attentive to the text of the Act, the words-in-total-context approach
places primary emphasis on the words of the statutory text, giving “greater
weight to clear words supported by their immediate context than to larger
assertions of parliamentary intention, particularly those based on extrinsic
evidence.”188 Unlike the plain meaning rule, on the other hand, which
disregards contextual and purposive considerations except where the words
of the Act are ambiguous on their face, the words-in-total-context approach
acknowledges the influence of context on statutory meaning and empha-
sizes the role of legislative intentions and statutory purposes as important
elements in this contextual analysis. Moreover, by recognizing both textual
and purposive considerations, the words-in-total-context approach limits
judicial discretion; promotes values of certainty, knowability, and legitimacy
associated with the rule of law; and respects democratic values associated
with the principle of legislative supremacy.189
Notwithstanding its superiority to purposive interpretation and the plain
meaning rule, however, the words-in-total-context approach suffers from
considerable uncertainty as to the appropriate scope of the interpretive
analysis that it suggests. In British Columbia Telephone Company v. The
Queen, for example, MacGuigan JA suggested that the words-in-total-
context approach involves only four elements: “the words themselves,
their immediate context, the purpose of the statute as manifested through-
out the legislation, and extrinsic evidence of parliamentary intent to the
extent admissible.”190 In Symes, however, both the majority and the minor-
ity decisions considered not only these four elements, but also the legal
and social context in which the relevant statutory provisions were enacted
and interpreted.191
This section examines the scope of contextual analysis, considering the
“internal context” of the statutory text (the words of the provision and
their relationship to the statute as a whole), the “external context” of the
Unfortunately, Cory J’s affirmation of the words-in-total-context approach is marred by
his simultaneous (and contradictory) affirmation of the plain meaning rule that “when
there is neither any doubt as to the meaning of the legislation nor any ambiguity in its
application to the facts then the statutory provision must be applied regardless of its object
or purpose.” Ibid., at 6248; 403.
188 British Columbia Telephone Company, supra footnote 132, at 6132; 31. See the analy-
sis of this case in part 1 of this article at footnotes 274 to 284 and accompanying text.
189 For a useful analysis of contextual approaches to the interpretation of the US Inter-
nal Revenue Code, see Lawrence Zelenak, “Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of
the Internal Revenue Code” (1986), vol. 64, no. 3 North Carolina Law Review 623-76.
190 Supra footnote 132, at 6132; 31.
191 See the analysis of the Symes case in part 1 of this article at footnotes 317 to 352 and
accompanying text.
187 Continued . . .
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statutory text (background assumptions concerning the purpose and subject-
matter of the provision, and the legal and cultural norms of the society in
which it was enacted and operates), and the challenges to statutory inter-
pretation arising from changed legal and social contexts. While the relevant
contexts for statutory interpretation necessarily depend on the facts of the
given case,192 the review of textual meaning in the previous section sug-
gests that it is inappropriate to exclude any relevant consideration from
the scope of contextual analysis. On the contrary, as one advocate explains,
“[t]he precise words which are in issue in relation to the facts must be
weighed in light of successive circles of context.”193
Internal Context
The internal context of a statutory text refers to the words of the provi-
sion at issue as well as other statutory provisions and structural features
(such as headings and subdivisions) relevant to the interpretation of these
words.194 While the words of the provision itself constitute the “immedi-
ate context” of the text, the relevant internal context may extend beyond
those words to include separate statutory definitions,195 related statutory
provisions,196 and the structure of the statute reflected in headings and
subdivisions.197
For formalists, this internal context is defined by traditional interpre-
tive canons concerning the interaction among specific words of the
provision itself as well as the relationship between the words of the pro-
vision and the statute as a whole. The associated words and limited class
rules (noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis), for example, reflect the
conventional insight that words take their meaning from accompanying
words and phrases with which they appear.198 The principle of implied
192 See, for example, Livingston, supra footnote 65, at 831, suggesting that the key
issue in tax interpretation “is not whether to rely on context, but rather which context is
most persuasive on the given facts [emphasis in original].”
193 Kernochan, supra footnote 56, at 348-49.
194 See Taylor, supra footnote 121, at 359-62.
195 See, for example, Friesen, supra footnote 122, in which the court considered the
definition of “inventory” in subsection 248(1) of the Act in order to determine the applica-
tion of the inventory valuation rule in subsection 10(1).
196 See, for example, Symes, supra footnote 70, in which the court considered the
statutory deduction for child-care expenses in section 63 of the Act in order to determine
the deductibility of child-care expenses under the general rules governing the deductibility
of business expenses. See also Friesen, supra footnote 122, in which the minority decision
emphasized the relationship between the inventory valuation rule in subsection 10(1) and
the general rule governing the computation of profit in subsection 9(1).
197 See, for example, Golden, supra footnote 39, in which the majority interpreted the
anti-avoidance rule in section 68 in light of its location in subdivision f, entitled “Rules
Relating to Computation of Income.”
198 Willis, supra footnote 2, at 6-7, observes that “words, like people, take colour from
their surroundings.” For a detailed discussion of these textual canons of construction, see
Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 197-213.
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exclusion (expressio unius est exclusio alterius), on the other hand, entails
an imputation of meaning from the absence of associated words that a
reader might normally expect.199 Other interpretive canons presume that
statutes are drafted clearly and precisely such that each and every word
must be given effect,200 that identical words and expressions are given
consistent meanings throughout the statute,201 and that conflicts are avoided
by giving priority to specific provisions over those of general application.202
In a devastating critique of the traditional canons of statutory construc-
tion, Karl Llewellyn adduced a contrary rule to each of these interpretive
maxims, concluding that “to make any canon take hold in a particular
instance, the construction contended for must be sold, essentially, by means
other than the use of the canon.”203 Similarly, US Judge Richard Posner
has written:
There are a vast number of canons, corresponding to the vast number of
considerations that come into play (often unconsciously) when one is read-
ing. Cautionary rather than directive, often pulling in opposite directions
like their counterparts the maxims of ordinary life (“haste makes waste,”
but “he who hesitates is lost”), the canons are the collective folk wisdom of
statutory interpretation and they no more enable difficult questions of in-
terpretation to be answered than the maxims of everyday life enable the
difficult problems of everyday life to be solved.204
As these and other critics have observed, while some canons may play
a useful role in directing the interpreter’s attention to the grammatical
structure of the text,205 their actual application in any given context depends
on external assumptions regarding the likely meaning and purpose of the
text.206 Other canons such as those presuming consistent expression and
structural coherence reflect extrinsic norms concerning the manner in
which statutes ought to be understood (and drafted), less than serious
efforts to gauge the legislature’s actual intentions and expectations re-
garding applicable provisions.207 In each case, therefore, analysis of the
internal context of a statutory text depends on the external context by
which the text is understood.
199 Willis, supra footnote 2, at 7-8, describes the maxim as “most unreliable.” For a
detailed discussion of this principle, see Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 168-76.
200 See Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 159-63.
201 Ibid., at 163-68.
202 Ibid., at 176-92.
203 Llewellyn, supra footnote 63, at 401.
204 Posner, supra footnote 60, at 280.
205 See, for example, Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 454-56.
206 See, for example, Farber, “The Inevitability of Practical Reason,” supra footnote 89,
at 535-41. See also Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra footnote 60, at 283,
observing that “[m]ost of the canons are highly context-dependent.”
207 See, for example, Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 425-26 and 437-41, questioning the
agency model of statutory interpretation, according to which judges are strictly constrained
to promote the will of the legislature.
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External Context
The external context of a statutory text refers to all relevant information
beyond the words of the statute itself that sheds light on the text’s meaning.
As suggested earlier, it includes the common understanding of the language
in which the statute is written, background assumptions as to the purpose
and subject-matter of the text, and the legal and cultural norms of the
society in which the statute is enacted and interpreted.208
The relevance of external context to statutory interpretation is explicit
in traditional doctrines regarding statutes that use common law terms and
concepts, which are presumed to retain their common law meanings sub-
ject to specific statutory definitions to the contrary,209 and statutes on the
same subject (in pari materia), which are to be “taken and construed
together, as one system, and as explanatory of each other.”210 Other appli-
cations of external context are apparent in established presumptions that
statutes should be interpreted to comply with constitutional and inter-
national law.211 In addition to these more visible examples, external context
enters into statutory interpretation in the various background assumptions
of meaning, purpose, and subject-matter that judicial interpreters bring to
the statutory text at issue.
Like the textual canons of construction examined above, substantive
canons comprising the external context of the text reflect both plausible
assumptions as to the legislature’s likely intentions and expectations and
judicially imposed norms regarding the manner in which statutes ought to
be understood.212 Indeed, as discussed earlier, the traditional rule accord-
ing to which taxing statutes were to be strictly construed reflected extrinsic
norms derived from 19th-century conceptions of the state and private
property much more than plausible assumptions as to the legislature’s
actual intentions and expectations. Given the democratic character of the
modern state and the varied purposes of modern tax statutes, however,
this interpretive doctrine and the legal and cultural norms on which it is
based became increasingly anachronistic.213
208 See supra footnote 134.
209 See the discussion in Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 301-4.
210 Rex v. Loxdale (1758), 97 ER 394, at 395 (KB). For a contemporary Canadian
authority, see Nova v. Amoco Canadian Petroleum Co. Ltd. (1981), 128 DLR (3d) 1, at 9
(SCC), per Estey J: “While each statute must, for the purpose of its interpretation, stand
on its own and be examined according to its terminology and the general legislative
pattern it establishes, sometimes assistance in determining the meaning of the statute can
be drawn from similar or comparable legislation within the jurisdiction or elsewhere.” For
a detailed discussion of this principle of statutory interpretation, see Sullivan, supra foot-
note 11, at 285-88.
211 See the discussion of these presumptions in Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 322-45.
212 See the analysis of interpretive principles in Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 456-60.
213 See the discussion at footnotes 4 to 39 and accompanying text.
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While statutory interpretation cannot proceed without background norms
and assumptions,214 these norms and assumptions should reflect the val-
ues of the society of which they are a part, not those of a bygone era.215
For this reason, a residual presumption in favour of the taxpayer, a linger-
ing legacy of strict construction,216 is perhaps less convincing than a
residual presumption in favour of political accountability and democratic
decision making.217 In a case like Symes, where the taxpayer sought unsuc-
cessfully to deduct child-care expenses under the general rules governing
the deduction of business expenses, such a presumption would have
favoured the taxpayer, prompting a more general debate about the struc-
ture and purpose of the statutory child-care expense deduction and the
pervasive inequities between the tax treatment of business and employ-
ment income.218 In Fries v. The Queen,219 on the other hand, where the
taxpayer argued successfully that strike pay was not income from an
unspecified source within the meaning of paragraph 3(a) of the Act, such
a presumption would have favoured the Crown,220 requiring labour unions
and their members to justify a special exemption for strike pay notwith-
standing that union dues are deductible in computing a taxpayer’s
employment income221 and the investment income that accumulates in a
union’s strike fund is tax-exempt.222
Changed Contexts
Among the most difficult issues in statutory interpretation is the impact
of changes in the legal and social contexts in which statutory provisions
are read and applied.223 As the demise of strict construction illustrates,
214 See the discussion at footnotes 131 to 166 and accompanying text.
215 See, for example, Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 462-93, discussing and proposing
interpretive principles for the modern regulatory state. See also William N. Eskridge Jr.,
“Public Values in Statutory Interpretation” (April 1989), 137 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 1007-1104.
216 See the analysis in part 1 of this article at footnotes 91 to 98 and accompanying text.
217 See, for example, Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 413, favouring interpretive princi-
ples that “will serve the purposes of deliberative government”; and Eskridge, Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation, supra footnote 60, at 285-97, discussing the role of substantive
canons to implement underenforced constitutional norms, to enhance democracy, and to
ameliorate dysfunctions in the democratic process.
218 See the analysis of the Symes case in part 1 of this article at footnotes 317 to 352
and accompanying text.
219 90 DTC 6662; [1990] 2 CTC 439 (SCC).
220 Given the language of paragraph 3(a), which applies to income from all sources, of
which office, employment, business, and property are listed as prominent examples “with-
out restricting the generality” of the general inclusion, it is arguable that the strike pay
should have been taxable even without relying on such a residual presumption.
221 See paragraph 8(1)(i).
222 See paragraph 149(1)(k).
223 See, for example, Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 493, emphasizing that “[w]hen
circumstances change, statutory interpretation becomes especially difficult.”
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these legal and social changes are apt to produce changes in the back-
ground norms and assumptions through which courts interpret statutory
texts. As well, as suggested by the Supreme Court of Canada decision in
Symes, these changes can affect the interpretation of specific statutory
provisions themselves, the original enactment of which may have reflected
a set of norms and assumptions (for example, in Symes, that child-care
expenses are purely personal expenses and not incurred for the purpose of
gaining or producing income) that are no longer widely shared.224
In these circumstances, at least one commentator has argued that courts
should have the authority to disregard obsolete provisions, treating them
as if they were “no more and no less than part of the common law.”225
Other commentators reject this idea on the basis that it contradicts the
principle of legislative supremacy, but argue that courts should adapt
statutory provisions to new conditions by interpreting statutory language
in light of contemporary social and legal values.226 In a notable US tax
case,227 for example, a non-profit private school with a racially discrimi-
natory admissions policy was denied tax-exempt charitable status,
notwithstanding that the Internal Revenue Code contained no explicit
prohibition to this effect and that Congress would have been unlikely to
object to discriminatory admissions policies when the exemption was first
enacted in 1894. Indeed, to the extent that the meaning of a statutory text
depends on the perspective of the interpreter and the circumstances in
which the text is interpreted,228 it is arguable that statutory interpretation
is inescapably dynamic, whether or not the court explicitly acknowledges
the influence of changes in the legal and social context.229
Although originalist models of statutory interpretation suggest that courts
should respond to changed contexts by adhering steadfastly to meanings
likely to be held by the enacting legislature, leaving it to contemporary
224 See the analysis of the Symes case in part 1 of this article at footnotes 317 to 352
and accompanying text.
225 Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1982), 2. For a critical evaluation of this proposal, see Robert Weisberg,
“The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process” (January 1983), 35
Stanford Law Review 213-57.
226 See, for example, Dworkin, supra footnote 60, at 313-54; Eskridge, “Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation,” supra footnote 60; Aleinikoff, supra footnote 60; Eskridge, Dynamic Statu-
tory Interpretation, supra footnote 60; and Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 493-97.
227 Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 US 574 (1983).
228 See, for example, Gadamer, supra footnote 130, at 265-341, emphasizing the “histo-
ricity of understanding,” which conditions the interpretive “horizon” available to the
interpreter; discussing Aristotle’s concept of practical reasoning (phronesis); and explain-
ing (at 310) that “discovering the meaning of a legal text and discovering how to apply it
in a particular legal instance are not two separate actions, but one unitary process.”
229 See, for example, Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra footnote 60, at
48-68.
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legislatures to update statutory provisions,230 several arguments favour a
more dynamic approach according to which statutory provisions should
be understood in their contemporary context notwithstanding the original
meanings likely to have been held by the enacting legislature. First, as at
least one commentator has observed, such an approach may be consistent
with the legislature’s more general intentions and purposes to ensure the
statute’s reasonable application to changing circumstances.231 Indeed, to
the extent that a statute employs general language like “personal or living
expenses,”232 it is arguable that the legislature has deliberately delegated
to the courts the task of defining such terms in the context of particular
cases. That previous judicial decisions may have regarded child-care ex-
penses as wholly personal, therefore, should not govern the characteriza-
tion of these expenses in the context of a different legal and social
environment. As a result, both majority and minority decisions in Symes
were surely right to reject the view that child-care expenses were neces-
sarily personal in nature.233
More generally, as Sunstein explains, a dynamic approach to statutory
interpretation “is likely to produce greater coherence in the law; to reduce
the problem, pervasive in modern government, of regulation by measures
that are badly out of date; and to lead to a legal system that is both more
rational and more consistent with democratic norms.”234 In Symes, for
example, the minority decision would have rendered the tax treatment of
child-care expenses more compatible with the principles of gender equal-
ity enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, recognized
expenses much greater than the unrealistically low limits that were then
allowed by the statutory deduction, and fostered a democratic debate about
the structure and purpose of the child-care expense deduction and the
inequities between the tax treatment of business and employment income.
The majority decision, on the other hand, relied on Parliament’s original
intention to enact a limited statutory deduction for child-care expenses in
concluding that this statutory deduction precluded the deduction of child-
care expenses under the general rules governing the computation of
business income, notwithstanding the absence of any explicit language to
230 See, for example, John Copeland Nagle, “Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory Inter-
preter” (June 1995), 143 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2209-50; and Anthony
D’Amato, “The Injustice of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation” (Spring 1996), 64 Univer-
sity of Cincinnati Law Review 911-35.
231 Aleinikoff, supra footnote 60, at 56-57. See also Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 433,
suggesting that instead of “going back” to ask how the enacting legislature would have
interpreted the statute, “perhaps the better route would be to imagine that the enacting
legislature could be ‘brought forward’ into the present and then to ask how it would decide
the question in light of new developments of law, fact, and policy.”
232 See paragraph 18(1)(h) of the Act, which prohibits the deduction of “personal or
living expenses” in computing a taxpayer’s income from a business or property.
233 On this point and in respect of the commentary immediately following, see the analy-
sis of the Symes case in part 1 of this article at footnotes 317 to 352 and accompanying text.
234 Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 494.
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this effect. Given the “significant social change in the late 1970s and into
the 1980s, in terms of the influx of women of child-bearing age into
business and into the workplace” that the majority itself noted,235 it is
arguable that Parliament’s original intention in enacting section 63 should
have been given much less weight than contemporary understandings re-
garding the tax character of child-care expenses.
PRAGMATIC APPROACH
In rejecting the extremes of purposive interpretation on the one hand and
the plain meaning rule on the other, the words-in-total-context approach
affirms a more “open-textured” approach to statutory interpretation,236 in
which the words of the Act are read “in their entire context . . . harmoni-
ously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention
of Parliament.”237 In this respect, it is largely pragmatic, in the tradition
of the philosophical movement of this name, which shuns “foundationalist”
theories of knowledge in favour of more contextual modes of reasoning
that draw on a plurality of values and considerations.238 In contrast to a
more thoroughgoing pragmatism, however, which would also consider
the practical consequences of different interpretations,239 the words-in-
total-context approach limits the scope of the interpretive inquiry to the
words of the Act, the scheme of the Act, the purposes of the Act, and the
intentions of Parliament.
235 Symes, supra footnote 70, at 6011; 54, citing the decision of the trial judge, 89 DTC
5243, at 5248; [1989] 1 CTC 476, at 483 (FCTD).
236 British Columbia Telephone Company, supra footnote 132, at 6132; 31. This case is
discussed in part 1 of this article at footnotes 274 to 284 and accompanying text.
237 E.A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983), 87.
238 For a useful introduction to philosophical pragmatism, see Louis Menand, ed.,
Pragmatism: A Reader (New York: Vintage, 1997). On the relevance of philosophical pragma-
tism to statutory interpretation, see Eskridge and Frickey, supra footnote 88; Farber, “The
Inevitability of Practical Reason,” supra footnote 89; and Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, supra footnote 60, at 192-204, referring to his proposed interpretive ap-
proach as “critical pragmatism.” On the relevance of philosophical pragmatism to legal
thought more generally, see “Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American
Legal Thought” (1990), 63 Southern California Law Review 1569-1909. For a similar
argument for a pragmatic approach to statutory interpretation, of which I became aware
only after completing this article, see Ruth Sullivan, “Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme
Court of Canada” (1998-99), 30 Ottawa Law Review 175-223.
239 See, for example, William James, Pragmatism (1907), Bruce Kuklick, ed. (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1981), 26, explaining that the “pragmatic method” endeavours “to interpret each
notion by tracing its respective practical consequences.” For pragmatic approaches to
statutory interpretation emphasizing the consequences of alternative interpretations, see
Posner, supra footnote 60, at 299-300, suggesting that statutory interpretation might pro-
ceed by examining consequences alone and observing that “among the consequences to be
considered is the impact that unpredictable statutory applications will have on communi-
cation between the legislature and court”; and Brooks, supra footnote 181, at 99, arguing
that “[t]he role of judges in tax cases should not involve parsing the words and phrases of
the tax legislation, or attempting to decipher the legislature’s true intent or purpose from
(The footnote is continued on the next page.)
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This section sets out the basic principles of a pragmatic approach to
statutory interpretation, considering the role of consequential analysis in
statutory interpretation and the manner in which practical consequences
and other interpretive considerations are properly brought together in the
context of a particular case.
Consequential Analysis
Among the key premises of philosophical pragmatism is the view, familiar
to students of the common law, that sound judgments are best made not in
the abstract but in the context of specific problems requiring principled
answers. The early American pragmatist William James explained:
The pragmatist clings to facts and concreteness, observes truth at its work
in particular cases and generalizes. Truth, for him, becomes a class-name
for all sorts of definite working-values in experience.240
The American pragmatic jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes made a similar
point when he wrote in the opening paragraph of his book The Common
Law, “The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.”241
Indeed, this insight appears in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, which
emphasizes the practical nature of human judgment, noting that sound
deliberation concerns itself not with universal principles in the abstract,
but with the application of these universals to particular circumstances.242
Likewise in statutory interpretation, the judge is not involved in an
abstract debate about the meaning of the statutory text, but in a thor-
oughly practical exercise concerning its application to a particular set of
facts. As J.A. Corry observed,
no judge ever begins the process of judging until he knows the facts upon
which he is to decide. Then he begins at once to think of the statute in
the legislative debates or some other source” but should “involve three steps: (1) the
postulation of a range of plausible, alternate policy options for each interpretive issue; (2)
a consideration of the consequences of each in terms of tax fairness, the neutrality of the
tax system, administrative practicality, and other relevant evaluative criteria; and then (3)
a choice among the alternatives based upon what makes the most sense in terms of tax
principles (given the general structure of the tax legislation being interpreted).” To the
extent that these consequentialist approaches downplay or render contingent important
values associated with a separate emphasis on textual and purposive considerations, they
constitute a form of consequentialist foundationalism inconsistent with the pluralistic prag-
matism advocated here.
240 James, Pragmatism, supra footnote 239, at 34.
241 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (1881), Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed. (Boston:
Little Brown, 1963), 6. For an excellent account of Holmes’s legal pragmatism, see Thomas
C. Grey, “Holmes and Legal Pragmatism” (April 1989), 41 Stanford Law Review 787-870.
242 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985),
book VI, chapter 7, paragraph 1141b, observing that the practical wisdom involved in
good deliberation not only is concerned with “universals,” but “must also come to know
particulars, since it is concerned with action and action is about particulars.” On the
relevance of Aristotle’s practical philosophy to modern hermeneutics, see Gadamer, supra
footnote 130, at 312-24, emphasizing the situated character of moral knowledge.
239 Continued . . .
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relation to those facts and they inevitably colour his interpretation. . . . In
considering his decision, he goes back and forth from facts to statute and
from statute to facts, and the processes of interpretation and application are
telescoped together in a manner that defies separation.243
Not surprisingly, therefore, judges are likely to consider the practical
consequences of alternative interpretations, regarding those considered
just or good more favourably than those deemed unjust or unreason-
able.244 The traditional “golden rule,” for example, has long allowed courts
to depart from the literal words of a statute in order to avoid “absurd” or
“anomalous” results.245 Moreover, in the years since Stubart, the Supreme
Court of Canada has engaged in consequential analysis on several occa-
sions in order to decide among alternative interpretations.
In Bronfman Trust, for example, where the taxpayer argued that inter-
est on borrowed money used to finance capital allocations to the beneficiary
of a personal trust should qualify for the deduction in subparagraph
20(1)(c)(i) of the Act on the grounds that the borrowed money preserved
the income-producing assets of the trust, Dickson CJ observed that “the
consequences of the interpretation sought by the trust” would be unfair as
between affluent taxpayers with income-earning property and less afflu-
ent taxpayers without such assets:
In order for the trust to succeed, subparagraph 20(1)(c)(i) would have to be
interpreted so that a deduction would be permitted for borrowings by any
taxpayer who owned income-producing assets. Such a taxpayer could, on
this view, apply the proceeds of a loan to purchase a life-insurance policy,
to take a vacation, to buy speculative properties, or to engage in any other
non-income-earning or ineligible activity. Nevertheless, the interest would
be deductible. A less wealthy taxpayer, with no income-earning assets,
would not be able to deduct interest payments on loans used in the identi-
cal fashion. Such an interpretation would be unfair as between taxpayers
and would make a mockery of the statutory requirement that, for interest
payments to be deductible, borrowed money must be used for circumscribed
income-producing purposes.246
Together with the court’s purposive approach, this consequential analysis
creates a compelling argument against deductibility on the facts of the case.247
243 Corry, supra footnote 5, at 291. See also Gadamer, supra footnote 130, at 329,
emphasizing that “[t]he work of interpretation is to concretize the law in each specific
case—i.e., it is a work of application”; and Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 79, noting that
“[w]hen a court is called on to interpret legislation, it is not engaged in an academic
exercise. Interpretation involves the application of legislation to facts in a way that affects
the well-being of persons for better or worse.”
244 On the role of consequential analysis in statutory interpretation, see Sullivan, supra
footnote 11, at 79-99.
245 See the discussion in part 1 of this article at footnotes 64 to 79 and accompanying text.
246 Bronfman Trust, supra footnote 35, at 5065; 126.
247 See the analysis of the Bronfman Trust case in part 1 of this article at footnotes 122
to 145 and accompanying text. As explained in part 1 (at footnote 134 and accompanying
(The footnote is continued on the next page.)
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Likewise, in Antosko, where the minister argued, inter alia, that the
deduction of accrued interest on the transfer of a debt obligation under
paragraph 20(14)(b) of the Act was conditional on the prior inclusion of
the interest under paragraph 20(14)(a), Iacobucci J rejected this argument
on the grounds, among others, that “the consequences that would ensue”
if the provision were read in this way would be anomalous in the context
of “open-market bond transactions,” to which the provision “would be
equally applicable”:
It is simply unworkable to require market purchasers to discern whether the
vendor of the bond is tax-exempt in order to be able to assess whether a s.
20(14)(b) deduction is permitted. Without this knowledge, the prospective
purchaser would thus be unable to gauge the true value of the security.
Moreover, a debt instrument held by a non-taxable entity would be worth
less than an identical instrument held by a body that was liable to tax. Any
taxpayer who purchased a security previously held by either the federal or
provincial Crown, or by one of the persons enumerated in s. 149(1) of the
Act [listing persons exempt from tax], would be disentitled from deduct-
ing. Given that many of the bonds sold on the open market are sold by the
Bank of Canada, a body to whom s. 20(14)(a) does not apply, the interpre-
tation of the section advanced by the respondent would mean that these
bonds would have to be sold at a discount compared with identical bonds
sold by other parties.248
Although the deduction in Antosko might have been disallowed on the
grounds that it was “artificial” or “synthetic,” the court’s consequential
analysis, together with its textual analysis, renders its conclusion on the
relationship between paragraphs 20(14)(a) and (b) highly persuasive.249
Other examples of consequential analysis can be found in other cases
surveyed in part 1 of this article—some of them convincing, others less so.
In Friesen, for example, the minority’s purposive argument that the lower
of cost and market rule in subsection 10(1) of the Act was unavailable to
taxpayers engaged in adventures in the nature of trade was strengthened
by the observation that this result would require difficult and costly annual
valuations of all such property, absent any sale.250 In McClurg, on the
other hand, the majority’s problematic analysis of subsection 56(2) of
the Act is aided by its questionable conclusion that the application of this
anti-avoidance rule to dividends could render corporate directors “liable
for the tax consequences of any declaration of dividends made to a third
text), the court might have devoted more attention to the text of subparagraph 20(1)(c)(i),
which refers to the purpose for which borrowed money is used, not (as the court empha-
sized) the direct use of the borrowed money.
248 Antosko, supra footnote 34, at 6322; 35.
249 See the analysis of the Antosko case in part 1 of this article at footnotes 208 to 229
and accompanying text.
250 Supra footnote 122, at 5571; 405-6. See the discussion of this point in part 1 of this
article at footnotes 266 to 267 and accompanying text.
247 Continued . . .
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party.”251 As explained in part 1 of this article, since a benefit within the
meaning of the provision cannot be said to exist where a payment is made
“for adequate consideration in the context of a legitimate business relation-
ship,” it follows that subsection 56(2) would not apply to the declaration
and payment of dividends in the context of ordinary commercial relation-
ships between arm’s-length parties even if dividends were not excluded
from the scope of the anti-avoidance rule.252
While it is always possible for courts to mischaracterize the likely
consequences of a particular interpretation, as it is possible for courts to
misread the text of a statutory provision, or misconstrue its purpose, the
many decisions in which the Supreme Court of Canada has considered the
practical consequences of alternative interpretations suggest that conse-
quential analysis is often relevant to statutory interpretation. In several of
these cases, for example, the consequences of particular interpretations
are considered incompatible with legislative intentions.253 Since legisla-
tors are unlikely to have discussed or even foreseen the interpretive issue
with which the court must deal,254 however, these references to legislative
intent are largely fictional, suggesting incompatibility with statutory pur-
poses more generally defined255 or with widely held background norms
regarding the manner in which statutes ought to apply irrespective of any
actual legislative intent.256 In this respect, like the substantive canons of
statutory construction examined earlier, an interpretive presumption against
unjust or unreasonable consequences reflects both a plausible assumption
as to the legislature’s likely intentions and expectations, and a judicially
251 Supra footnote 35, at 5012; 184. See also Neuman, supra footnote 33, at 6303; 190,
contending that the majority’s interpretation in McClurg “is the only interpretation which
makes sense and avoids absurdity in the application of s. 56(2).”
252 See the analysis of the McClurg and Neuman decisions in part 1 of this article at
footnotes 146 to 193 and accompanying text. For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see
Duff, supra footnote 93.
253 See, for example, Bronfman Trust, supra footnote 35, at 5065; 126, per Dickson CJ,
concluding that “the consequences of the interpretation sought by the trust” suggest that
“it cannot have been intended by Parliament”; the majority decision in McClurg, supra
footnote 35, at 5012; 184, concluding that the application of subsection 56(2) to dividends
“cannot legitimately be considered as within the parameters of the legislative intent” of
the provision; and the minority decision in Friesen, supra footnote 122, at 5571; 405-6,
per Iacobucci J, questioning whether it was “the intent of the drafters of the exception to
the realization principle contained in subsection 10(1)” to require owners of property held
as an adventure in the nature of trade “to make yearly appraisals of the worth of that
property for taxation purposes.”
254 See supra footnote 50 and accompanying text.
255 See supra footnotes 60 to 61 and accompanying text. See also Sullivan, supra foot-
note 11, at 79: “Consequences judged to be good generally are presumed to be intended
and are regarded as part of the legislative purpose. Consequences judged to be unjust or
unreasonable are regarded as absurd and are presumed to have been unintended.”
256 See, for example, Sullivan, supra footnote 156, at 155, noting that “the norms relied
on by the courts are not personal whims” but “come out of common experiences and
values, a shared culture and knowledge base.”
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imposed norm regarding the manner in which statutory provisions ought
to be understood.
In either event, as Sunstein observes, “[b]ecause courts are able to
focus upon the concrete and often unforeseeable effects of general statu-
tory provisions, . . . they are in a better position [than legislatures] to
judge whether a particular provision produces peculiar consequences in a
particular setting.”257 In these circumstances, he explains, since it is “un-
realistic to think that any legislature can or should correct every such
problem,” a strong presumption against unjust or unreasonable conse-
quences is “entirely legitimate—at least if the injustice or irrationality is
palpable and there is no affirmative evidence that the legislature intended
the result.”258 As Sullivan concludes,
an essential part of the court’s role in statutory interpretation lies in adjust-
ing the application of fixed rules to individual cases in order to avoid
absurd or unjust results. This is the basis on which the equitable jurisdic-
tion of English courts was originally founded and later expanded in
subsequent centuries. Like the rigid forms of the early common law, statu-
tory rules sometimes require qualification or exception to ensure justice in
particular circumstances. This flexibility does not undermine the authority
of the legislature, but complements it.259
As a result, it follows, the practical consequences of alternative inter-
pretations are an important consideration in statutory interpretation in
addition to the words of the Act, the scheme of the Act, the purposes of
the Act, and the intentions of Parliament. Indeed, the current most recent
statement of the “modern interpretation rule” in Driedger on the Con-
struction of Statutes identifies “the consequences of proposed interpreta-
tions” as a separate element in statutory interpretation in addition to textual
and purposive considerations.260
Pluralism
In addition to its emphasis on consequential analysis, philosophical prag-
matism favours “anti-foundationalist” modes of reasoning that draw on a
plurality of values and considerations. The American philosopher Charles
Sanders Peirce suggested in an early essay on pragmatic philosophy:
257 Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 482.
258 Ibid.
259 Sullivan, supra footnote 156, at 155. See also Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, supra
footnote 242, book V, paragraph 1137b: “[W]henever the law makes a universal rule, but
in this particular case what happens violates the [intended scope of] the universal rule,
here the legislator falls short, and has made an error by making an unconditional rule.
Then it is correct to rectify the deficiency; this is what the legislator would have said
himself if he had been present there, and what he would have prescribed, had he known, in
his legislation.”
260 Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 131: “An appropriate interpretation is one that can be
justified in terms of (a) its plausibility, that is, its compliance with the legislative text; (b)
its efficacy, that is, its promotion of the legislative purpose; and (c) its acceptability, that
is, the outcome is reasonable and just.”
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Philosophy ought . . . to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its
arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not
form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose
fibres may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and
intimately connected.261
A similar emphasis on philosophical pluralism is apparent in the dialogical
method of reasoning favoured by contemporary pragmatists such as Rich-
ard Bernstein.262
Likewise with statutory interpretation, pragmatic approaches are plu-
ralistic and dialogical, drawing on a variety of values and considerations.263
The words-in-total-context approach, for example, employs a pluralistic
methodology by requiring the words of a statute to be read (according to
Driedger’s prescription) “in their entire context . . . harmoniously with
the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parlia-
ment.”264 Similarly, the pragmatic approach proposed in this article suggests
that the words of the relevant statutory provision be read in their total
context, having regard to the scheme of the Act, the purposes of the Act,
the intentions of Parliament, and the practical consequences of different
interpretations. The key issue in the application of this pragmatic ap-
proach concerns the manner in which these various interpretive elements
should be taken into account in the context of a particular case.
As the passage from Driedger suggests, the most persuasive interpreta-
tions are those that take all relevant considerations into account, fashioning
a mutual harmony among different interpretive elements. As William
Eskridge and Philip Frickey explain,
a true dialogue with the text requires the interpreter to reconsider her
preunderstandings as she considers the specific evidence in the case, and
then to formulate a new understanding, which in turn is subject to recon-
sideration. . . . The “to and fro movement” involved in the hermeneutical
circle is not just the interpreter’s movement from a general view of the
statute to the specific evidence and back again; rather, it requires her to test
different understandings of the text in an ongoing effort to determine its
proper interpretation.265
261 Charles Sanders Peirce, “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities” (1868), in Max
H. Fisch, general ed., Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, vol. 2 (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 213.
262 See, for example, Richard J. Bernstein, The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political
Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), 336-37, advocat-
ing an “engaged fallibilistic pluralism” in which interlocutors “genuinely seek to achieve a
mutual reciprocal understanding” by recognizing the value of alternative perspectives and
the contingency of their own.
263 For example, Eskridge and Frickey, supra footnote 88, at 345-62, present a “posi-
tive model of practical reasoning in statutory interpretation” that attempts both to explain
the US Supreme Court’s practice in statutory interpretation and to reflect the insights of
pragmatic and hermeneutical theories of interpretation.
264 Driedger, supra footnote 237, at 87.
265 Eskridge and Frickey, supra footnote 88, at 352. See also the discussion at footnotes
142 to 145 and accompanying text.
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In easy cases, where different interpretive elements point in the same
direction, the interpretive process is largely invisible and the meaning of
the statutory provision may be characterized as “clear and plain.”266 In
more difficult cases, however, where different interpretive elements ap-
pear discordant, the pragmatic approach proposed here suggests that these
elements be reconsidered to determine whether they can be brought into
harmony, and that they be weighed according to relative priorities only
where these initial conflicts prove to be irreconcilable.
Although difficult, some of the cases considered in part 1 of this article
suggest that apparently discordant interpretive elements may be rendered
mutually consistent by a dialogic interpretive approach, such as that pro-
posed here, which requires initial understandings to be reconsidered in light
of other interpretive elements. In Golden, for example, where the tax-
payer argued that the anti-avoidance rule in section 68 did not apply to
transactions involving the sale of property alone, the majority’s words-in-
total-context approach resulted in a plausible reading of the statutory text
in harmony with the majority’s persuasive analysis of the scheme of the
Act, the object of the Act, and parliamentary intentions.267
In other cases examined in part 1, a pragmatic approach to statutory
interpretation such as that advocated here could have produced a greater
degree of interpretive harmony than that achieved by purposive interpre-
tation, which downplays textual considerations, or the plain meaning rule,
which downplays purposive considerations. In Neuman, for example, atten-
tion to the text of subsection 56(2), which applies “to the extent that” the
payment or transfer of property at issue “would be [included in computing
the taxpayer’s income] if the payment or transfer had been made to the
taxpayer,” and to the consequences of the transaction, which permitted
the taxpayer to split income with his spouse, might have supported a
different outcome consistent with the provision’s acknowledged purpose
“to prevent tax avoidance through income splitting.”268 In Friesen, on the
other hand, where the taxpayer relied on the inventory valuation rule in
subsection 10(1) (as it then read) to deduct unrealized losses on an inter-
est in real property held as an adventure in the nature of trade, attention
to the purpose of the provision to permit a limited exception to the reali-
zation and matching principles, and to the consequences of the decision,
which would require annual valuation of property held as an adventure in
the nature of trade, might have led to a different result based on a more
266 See, for example, Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 423. See also the discussion at
footnotes 146 to 150 and accompanying text.
267 See the analysis of the Golden case in part 1 of this article at footnotes 291 to 316
and accompanying text.
268 Supra footnote 33, at 6301; 187. See the analysis of the Neuman case in part 1 of
this article at footnotes 178 to 193 and accompanying text. See also the more detailed
analysis of this case in Duff, supra footnote 93.
INTERPRETING THE INCOME TAX ACT—PART 2 795
(1999), Vol. 47, No. 4 / no 4
careful reading of the key opening words of subsection 10(1), “[f]or the
purpose of computing income from a business.”269
Where interpretive elements remain implacably opposed, however,
courts face an unavoidable choice as to the weight or priority to be accorded
to each interpretive element. With respect to this choice, the pragmatic
approach proposed here follows the traditional practice of English, US,
and Canadian jurisprudence by according greater weight to apparently
unambiguous words supported by their immediate context than to other
elements of statutory meaning, and greater weight to legislative inten-
tions and statutory purposes than to practical consequences.270 Although
one might reasonably favour a different ranking of priorities,271 this tradi-
tional hierarchy reflects a range of values that are widely shared in
contemporary liberal-democratic societies.
As Eskridge and Frickey explain, a preference for textual elements in
statutory interpretation reflects widely held values associated with legis-
lative supremacy and the rule of law:
Formally, all that is enacted into law is the statutory text, and at the very
least legislative supremacy means that an interpreter must be attentive to
the text. Functionally, citizens and lawmakers will rely on the apparent
meaning of statutory texts. Textual primacy can also be a useful concrete
limit on judicial power.272
For these reasons, it is generally agreed, courts should give “significant
weight” to the “ordinary meaning” of a text that would be “understood by
a competent user of the language upon reading the words in their imme-
diate context.”273 To the extent that the scheme of the Act sheds light on
this text, however, textual analysis should “further consider how the statu-
tory provision at issue coheres with the general structure of the statute.”274
In general, though, the values underlying a preference for textual consid-
erations suggest that judicial interpretations should normally be limited
to plausible interpretations “that the text of the legislation is reasonably
capable of bearing.”275 In certain contexts, however—for example, in the
269 See the analysis of the Friesen case in part 1 of this article at footnotes 230 to 268
and accompanying text.
270 For a similar approach, see the “funnel of abstraction” proposed in Eskridge and
Frickey, supra footnote 88, at 353.
271 See, for example, Brooks, supra footnote 181, who favours consequential over textual
and purposive considerations.
272 Eskridge and Frickey, supra footnote 88, at 354.
273 Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 8 and 24-26, defining the “ordinary meaning” of a
text and explaining why the “ordinary meaning” of a legislative text is properly given
significant weight.
274 Eskridge and Frickey, supra footnote 88, at 355.
275 Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 101 and 103, defining this “plausible meaning rule” and
explaining why it is generally regarded as “an important constraint on judicial interpretation.”
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case of legislative mistakes or drafting errors—even unambiguous statu-
tory words may be outweighed by compelling purposive and consequential
considerations.276 Moreover, with respect to avoidance transactions, a simi-
lar emphasis on purpose over text has been written into the general
anti-avoidance rule in section 245 of the Act.277
Following these textual considerations, an emphasis on legislative in-
tentions and statutory purposes is generally defended in terms of their
consistency with the values of a democratic society. Eskridge and Frickey
observe:
Original legislative expectations are important in a democracy where the
legislature is the primary source of lawmaking. . . . To the extent that the
Court can recover that original meaning, it subserves democratic values by
enforcing the law as the legislature understood it, thus limiting judicial
discretion and power.278
In the context of the Income Tax Act, attention to purposive considera-
tions is likely to limit opportunities for abusive tax avoidance and reduce
the need for lengthy and complex provisions designed to reverse or prevent
judicial decisions at odds with legislative intentions or statutory pur-
poses.279 However, to the extent that purposive considerations are incom-
patible with any plausible reading of the statutory text, they are unlikely
to outweigh this textual consideration.
Among the various interpretive elements that a court might consider, the
practical consequences of a particular interpretation are generally accorded
the least weight in statutory interpretation. To the extent that consequential
considerations are generally “within the ambit of the legislature, not the
courts,”280 judicial attention to practical consequences appears to violate
both legislative supremacy and the rule of law.281 Nonetheless, as Sullivan
suggests, “these are not the only values worth striving for in our legal
system,” and they must be balanced against other important values, such as
fairness and efficiency.282 As a result, she explains, “the more compelling
the absurdity to be avoided, the greater the departure from ordinary meaning
276 See, for example, Triple “F” Holdings Ltd., supra footnote 119, at 138; 2087,
where the Tax Review Board read the words “corrugated iron” as “corrugated metal” after
accepting the evidence of a metallurgical engineer that “no such thing as corrugated iron
exists.” This case is discussed briefly in part 1 of this article at footnotes 77 to 79 and
accompanying text. For a more general discussion of drafting errors, see Sullivan, supra
footnote 11, at 104-10.
277 See the discussion in part 1 of this article at footnotes 226 to 227 and accompany-
ing text. See also the analysis of avoidance schemes in this context in Sullivan, supra
footnote 11, at 114-22.
278 Eskridge and Frickey, supra footnote 88, at 356.
279 See the discussion at footnotes 43 to 44 and accompanying text.
280 Antosko, supra footnote 34, at 6321; 33.
281 Sullivan, supra footnote 156, at 155-56.
282 Ibid., at 156.
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that may be tolerated.”283 As a general rule, however, consequential con-
siderations should never outweigh clear indications of legislative intentions
or statutory purposes.284
CONCLUSION
In the years since the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the traditional
strict construction rule in Stubart, the court has employed various doc-
trines to interpret the Income Tax Act, without yet settling on a preferred
approach. Some cases have applied a purposive or teleological approach
to statutory interpretation, according to which courts should “first . . .
determine the purpose of the legislation” and apply a strict or liberal
construction to the provision at issue “depending on the purpose underly-
ing it.”285 Other cases have adopted a plain meaning rule, requiring courts
to give effect to statutory words irrespective of their purpose or conse-
quences unless the statutory language “admits of some doubt or ambiguity
in its application to the facts,”286 in which event the court may then, but
only then, examine purposive or consequential considerations in order to
resolve the ambiguity.287 Yet other cases have employed the words-in-
total-context approach suggested by Driedger’s “modern rule,” according
to which “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in
their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of
the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.”288
None of these doctrines is as compelling as the pragmatic approach
outlined in this article. While purposive interpretation respects the demo-
cratic values expressed through legislative intentions and statutory
purposes, it accords insufficient weight to rule of law values reflected in
a primary emphasis on the words of the statutory text. While the plain
meaning rule affirms the primacy of statutory language, it downplays
other important values associated with democracy, fairness, and efficiency,
and oversimplifies the meaning of statutory texts, thereby artificially lim-
iting the scope of statutory interpretation and obscuring the grounds on
283 Sullivan, supra footnote 11, at 85.
284 See, for example, Sunstein, supra footnote 8, at 482, arguing that unjust or unrea-
sonable consequences justify “what might appear to be aggressive construction” provided
that “there is no affirmative evidence that the legislature intended the result.”
285 Corporation Notre-Dame de Bon-Secours, supra footnote 3, at 5023; 252. See the dis-
cussion of this doctrine in part 1 of this article at footnotes 99 to 193 and accompanying text.
286 Peter W. Hogg and Joanne E. Magee, Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law (Scar-
borough, Ont.: Carswell, 1995), 454, cited with approval in Friesen, supra footnote 122, at
5553; 373-74.
287 See the discussion of this doctrine in part 1 of this article at footnotes 194 to 268
and accompanying text.
288 Driedger, supra footnote 237, at 87, cited in Stubart, supra footnote 3, at 6323; 316.
See the discussion of this doctrine in part 1 of this article at footnotes 269 to 352 and
accompanying text.
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which judicial decisions are ultimately based. While the words-in-total-
context approach is more attractive than the other two doctrines, in that it
recognizes textual and purposive considerations, is most compatible with
the court’s actual practice (which tends to consider various aspects of
statutory meaning), and is most consistent with the dicta in Stubart, it is
unclear as to the allowable scope of contextual analysis and disregards
concerns for fairness and efficiency underlying judicial attention to con-
sequential considerations.
Unlike each of these interpretive doctrines, the pragmatic approach
proposed here makes the practical consequences of alternative interpreta-
tions an explicit consideration in statutory interpretation. Moreover, like
the words-in-total-context approach, it is pluralistic and dialogical, ac-
knowledging the many values and considerations at stake in statutory
interpretation, endeavouring to vindicate these values to the greatest extent
possible in the context of particular decisions, and striving toward mutual
harmony among different interpretive elements through a genuine interac-
tion between the interpreter and the text. Where this harmony is ultimately
unachievable, the pragmatic approach follows the traditional practice of
English, US, and Canadian jurisprudence by generally according more
weight to textual considerations than to purposive considerations, and more
weight to purposive considerations than to consequential considerations.
Since Supreme Court of Canada decisions interpreting the Income Tax
Act already examine textual, purposive, and consequential considerations,
the pragmatic approach advocated here is not so much a departure from
the court’s current practices as a more satisfactory account of these prac-
tices than the various doctrines to which the court actually refers. To the
extent that these doctrines shape the process of statutory interpretation
and the outcome of judicial decisions, however, this pragmatic approach
promises a more open, reasoned, and balanced method of statutory inter-
pretation than each of the alternatives otherwise available.
